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INTRODUCTION
The early tenure of the Trump Administration has featured 
robust challenges to the deference that courts have traditionally 
accorded the political branches in immigration law.1 In June 2017, 
the Supreme Court’s per curiam stay order2 regarding President 
1. That deference extends back to 1889, when the Supreme Court held that 
Congress had plenary power over immigration. See Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) [hereinafter The Chinese Exclusion Case]; see also 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (asserting that decisions of 
political branches on immigration are “largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference”); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citing “political branches’ broad power over the creation and administration of the 
immigration system”). Compare David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary 
Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 44 (2015) (discussing the most 
plausible arguments for judicial deference), with Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in 
the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (2015) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions 
relying on constitutional values in interpreting immigration statutes heralded
eventual demise of deference). 
2. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (ruling that 
noncitizens abroad otherwise affected by refugee EO were exempted if they had 
“bona fide relationship” with U.S. person or entity); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 34, 34 (2017), aff’d, IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (declining to stay portion of 
district court order barring government from enforcing EO against, inter alia,
noncitizens abroad granted refugee status and possessing “bona fide relationship” 
with U.S. person or entity, including U.S. spouse, parent, child, mother or father-in-
law, grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, and cousin, while staying 
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Trump’s second Executive Order (EO-2) on refugees and nationals 
of six countries3 did something unprecedented for that tribunal: It 
crafted an injunction that in effect required the admission of a 
substantial number of foreign nationals that the executive branch had 
wished to exclude. The indefinite restrictions in EO-2’s successor, 
EO-3, present another challenge to judicial deference.4 Deference 
was also under attack in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,5 in which the 
Supreme Court cited equal protection principles in striking down a 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that imposed 
a gender test on citizenship acquired by persons born out of wedlock 
abroad to one U.S citizen parent. These doctrinal stresses call for a 
new model of judicial review, which this Article calls shared 
stewardship.
Invocation of stewardship over immigration law fits the 
subject’s potential for change and growth. The formulation of criteria 
for the classification, admission, and removal of noncitizens requires 
the engagement of the federal government to fulfill what Hamilton 
called the “guardianship of the public safety.”6 Immigration policy’s 
impact on public safety is generally the province of the political 
branches, which have the information, resources, and capacity for 
quick response necessary for this task.7 Moreover, the political 
portion of district court order exempting from EO refugees who merely had “formal 
assurance” of sponsorship from U.S. refugee resettlement agency).
3. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,210 (Mar. 6, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-
nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2 [https://perma.cc/2BPG-FNT2] 
(suspending refugee admissions for 120 days and admission of nationals of Iran, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for ninety days) [hereinafter EO-2]. On 
September 24, 2017, as the provisions of EO-2 were about to expire, President 
Trump issued a new Proclamation imposing an indefinite ban on entry of most 
immigrants and some countries from an adjusted list of countries. See Proclamation 
No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,164 (Sept. 24, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-
enhancing-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry-united-states-
terrorists-public-safety-threats/ [https://perma.cc/92ZJ-ZUJY] [hereinafter EO-3]. 
4. See EO-2, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13,212. As of October 23, 2017, two 
U.S. district courts had issued temporary restraining orders of varying scope 
regarding EO-3. See IRAP v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
171879 *1, *141-42 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-99959, 2017 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 171242 *1, *13-14 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017). 
5. 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1679 (2017).
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961).
7. See IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (granting partial stay of lower court 
injunctions against refugee EO, asserting that “preserving national security is ‘an 
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branches’ electoral accountability situates them well to make 
substantive immigration decisions that shape the composition of 
community in the United States.8 For example, this country might 
wish to promote family reunification but determine that only spousal, 
parent-child, or sibling relationships suffice.9 Because those 
decisions about immigration priorities relate to the fundamental 
character of the polity itself, such decisions are properly the province 
of Congress—a broadly representative body that the Framers 
designed to solicit, consider, and implement community concerns.10
Congress has also delegated facets of immigration authority to 
the executive branch.11 For example, in a provision invoked by 
urgent objective of the highest order’”) (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010)); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (discussing “broad power” over immigration); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing 
Executive’s capacity for “dispatch” and “[d]ecision” (efficient decision making)); 
see generally Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential 
Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 105 (2014) (applying Hamilton’s perspective to contemporary questions of 
executive power over immigration); cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact 
Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (analyzing factors contributing to judicial 
deference to executive decisions).
8. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2006); MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE 62 (1983) (noting deep roots of “rule of citizens over non-
citizens, of members over strangers”); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and 
the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1069-70 (1994); 
Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 
370-71 (2008); but see BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 40 (2001) 
(suggesting that newcomers—even those who enter community without members’ 
prior consent—can revise and expand conception of democracy “beyond . . . 
(national) borders” and transcend limiting narrative of “unified demos stabilized by 
a metaphorics of national kinship”); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and 
Political Freedom, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 83, 89-93 (James 
E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (arguing that unrestricted migration 
encourages individuals to acquire and share information about political units and 
thus tends to enhance public good of sound governance). 
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2011) (defining “Immediate 
Relatives,” such as spouses, certain parents, and children of U.S. citizen sponsors, 
who are not subject to annual limits on immigration). 
10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 7, at 424 (describing legislature 
as best suited to “conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their 
privileges and interests”). 
11. For example, Congress has looked to State Department consular 
officials abroad to implement Congress’s guidance about the issuance of visas. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (setting out “[s]ecurity and related grounds” for inadmissibility, 
including “[t]errorist activities”); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-
Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty 5
President Trump, Congress has given the President a measure of 
discretion to bar the entry of “any aliens or of any class of aliens” 
whose admission would be “detrimental to the interests of the United 
States.”12 Presidents have used this power to pursue objectives such 
as negotiations with foreign states on immigration policy.13
However, in immigration as elsewhere, the executive branch 
should use its delegated power to further Congress’s “overall 
statutory scheme.”14 Executive branch measures that instead 
undermine that plan exceed the scope of Congress’s delegation. 
Moreover, the political branches’ zeal for public safety, or a 
prevailing vision of community composition, should not foster what 
Hamilton called a “spirit of injustice.”15 That toxic spirit would 
heedlessly exclude newcomers to the United States or ignore 
newcomers’ ties to U.S. persons and institutions. Guarding against 
such excesses, the courts must take a share in stewardship.
As is often case with judicial review, the sticking point is the 
level of review required. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, insisted on the close means-end 
nexus typically required of measures based on suspect or quasi-
suspect attributes such as gender.16 According to Justice Ginsburg, to 
justify such legislation, the government “must show . . . ‘that the 
[challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives 
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related 
70 (1972) (applying deferential “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard to 
adjudicate First Amendment challenge to visa denial); Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (deferring to consular decisions about inadmissibility 
based on national security grounds). 
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f); cf. IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 
2017) (reading § 1182(f) narrowly as not authorizing revised refugee EO); cert. 
granted and stayed in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017); vacated as moot, 138 S. 
Ct. 353, 353 (2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 777 (9th Cir. 2017) (reading 
§ 1182(f) narrowly), cert. granted and stayed in part sub nom IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 
2080; vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. at 353; Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (interpreting § 1182(f) narrowly). 
13. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165, 188 (1993) 
(holding that proclamation pursuant to § 1182(f) authorizing interdiction of refugees 
at sea was not prohibited by INA); sources cited infra note 300. 
14. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citing FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed.); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 257-58 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed.) (recommending that “[a] wise nation” minimize “both the necessity 
and the danger of resorting to [any means] . . . which may be inauspicious to its 
liberties”).
16. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
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to the achievement of those objectives.’”17 Applying this standard, 
the Court struck down a provision of the INA that required U.S. 
citizen mothers, compared with fathers, to be physically present in 
the United States for a shorter period to ensure that children born out 
of wedlock overseas acquired citizenship at birth. However, the 
Court expressly declined to apply this robust means-end test to the 
admission of foreign nationals.18 Signaling the durability of gender-
based tests for admission of foreign nationals, Justice Ginsburg cited 
Congress’s “exceptionally broad power” in this realm.19
Unfortunately, besides citing this history, Justice Ginsburg said 
little about how or why to distinguish the close means-end fit 
required in Morales-Santana from the more casual means-end fit 
expected of gender classifications elsewhere in immigration law. The 
Morales-Santana Court’s lack of guidance seems all the more 
puzzling in light of the painstaking provisional remedy regarding the 
admission of noncitizens that the Court imposed just weeks later in 
the litigation surrounding President Trump’s EO-2.20 Shared 
stewardship offers a more cohesive model for justifying the 
heightened review in Morales-Santana and determining the level of 
review that is appropriate in other areas. Those additional areas 
include President Trump’s EO-3, “extreme vetting” of foreign 
nationals abroad, and retroactive application of grounds for removal 
that can result in the deportation of longtime legal residents of the 
United States.21
Current judicial and academic accounts of judicial review in 
immigration law have not provided this cohesive account. As the thin 
explanation in Morales-Santana demonstrates, the Court itself has 
failed to offer a theory that justifies why certain measures receive 
searching judicial scrutiny, while others receive deference. The many 
judicial references to the “broad power” of Congress or the 
discretion wielded by the Executive have not crystallized into a 
persuasive approach. By the same token, the “normalization” thesis 
offered by many immigration scholars22 fails to comprehensively 
17. See id.
18. Id. at 1693.
19. Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 794 (1977)).
20. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (exempting foreign 
nationals from the revised EO if they had a “bona fide relationship” with a U.S. 
person or entity). 
21. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-89 (1952).
22. See Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good 
Victims: Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal 
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address the countervailing normative factors that courts should 
consider. Under the normalization thesis, courts should simply treat 
immigration measures as they would domestic legislation or 
administrative action. However, while the most thoughtful 
normalization theorists agree that in some subset of cases a nexus 
with foreign affairs should trigger heightened deference, in practice, 
normalization theorists unduly discount the foreign affairs role.23
To offer a cohesive normative account that fills the gaps left by 
immigration case law and commentary,24 shared stewardship relies 
Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 559 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law 
and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 262 (1984) 
(asserting that “it ignores reality to hold that every provision concerned with 
immigration, as applied to every fact situation it might encompass, is so intimately 
rooted in foreign policy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the 
effective conduct of foreign relations”); Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating 
“Immigration Law”, 68 FLA. L. REV. 179, 225 (2016) (offering the “normalization” 
thesis); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
339, 339 (2002); cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 614-18 (2017) (discussing premises of 
normalization thesis while arguing for more complex normative and descriptive 
account).
23. For example, in one of the most thoughtful articulations of the 
normalization approach, Professor Legomsky has argued that judicial deference may 
be appropriate, but only in “the special case in which the court concludes . . . that 
applying the normal standards of review would interfere with the conduct of foreign 
policy.” Legomsky, supra note 22, at 6. One can read Professor Legomsky’s caveat 
in one of two ways. Perhaps Professor Legomsky was recommending that courts 
consider whether the broad range of cases like the matter at issue were likely to 
affect foreign relations in some fashion. This approach actually bears some kinship 
to the shared stewardship model, although under the latter a challenger would also 
have to show the presence of other factors. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying 
text. However, one could also read Professor Legomsky’s caveat as requiring a 
judicial assessment of the foreign policy merits of a challenged measure. Of course, 
the latter reading would undermine the whole point of deference, which is to 
delegate assessment of the substantive merits to another entity besides the courts. 
24. Another account, the “hybrid” model offered by Professors Rubenstein 
and Gulasekaram, is an exceptionally promising approach that has widened analysis 
of factors relevant to judicial review. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 22, 
at 646. However, that breadth stems from the conclusion that immigration law 
includes too many factors to distill into a single approach. In that sense, although the 
hybrid model may well capture nuances that shared stewardship fails to address, the 
hybrid model describes those nuances at the expense of venturing a single normative 
account that will provide optimal guidance to courts and commentators. For better 
and worse, that latter goal is the ambition of the shared stewardship model advanced 
here. A model proposed recently, the “two-principals” approach, regards executive 
discretion over immigration as of equal importance to Congress’s power. See Adam 
B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, 104 (2015). However, although this model has also advanced debate 
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on three factors to trigger heightened review: (1) degree of sovereign 
interest;25 (2) number and intensity of collateral impacts; and (3) 
absence of intelligible limits. When courts find an attenuated 
sovereign interest, substantial collateral impacts on U.S. persons or 
entities, and no intelligible limits, courts should apply a more 
searching brand of review, requiring a tighter means-end fit between 
the challenged measure and its putative objectives. Often, application 
of that more rigorous standard would result in invalidation of the 
measure at issue. Conversely, a looser means-end fit would suffice 
when there is a significant sovereign interest supporting the measure, 
collateral impacts are few or nonexistent, and limits on the measure 
are intelligible. In that event, courts would generally uphold the 
measure, and let the political process adjudicate its fate. 
The three factors that drive the shared stewardship approach 
require additional explanation. The sovereign interest of the United 
States inheres both in substantive admission and removal criteria and 
the probability and gravity of foreign relations consequences. In a 
democracy, substantive criteria for both admission and removal are 
at the heart of sovereignty.26 When Congress has provided a 
comprehensive framework, courts owe that framework a measure of 
deference. Moreover, the executive branch’s initiatives should be 
largely interstitial, filling gaps without undermining Congress’s 
overarching structure. The exercise of “predictive judgment”27 by the 
Executive about the probability and gravity of adverse diplomatic or 
security consequences should elicit a measure of judicial deference, 
particularly when those judgments concern events overseas. 
However, courts should not clothe all immigration rules in crucial 
in useful ways, it is incomplete since it offers few consistent guideposts to 
distinguish between the actions of specific presidential administrations. A model 
that views President Obama as a co-principal of Congress can hardly deny that role 
to President Trump. To the extent that the two principals approach distinguishes 
between the actions of presidents based on case-by-case analysis, the model dilutes 
its distinctive claim of full presidential partnership. Moreover, the two principals 
model by definition has little to say about constitutional limits on the authority of 
Congress. In this respect, the shared stewardship approach offers further guidance.
25. Shared stewardship’s framing of this concern owes a debt to Professor 
Legomsky’s approach. See Legomsky, supra note 22, at 262. The Article’s effort to 
credit executive branch concerns owes much to the work of David Martin. See 
generally Martin, supra note 1; David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in 
the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165 
(1983). 
26. See WALZER, supra note 8, at 61; see also infra notes 147-50 and 
accompanying text (citing sources). 
27. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty 9
sovereign interests that may not fit the particular context the courts 
encounter. 
To demonstrate that more robust review of means-end fit is 
appropriate, a challenger of an immigration measure should also 
address the collateral impact of that measure. In the last forty years, 
that factor has been more salient in the Court’s consideration of state 
measures affecting immigration than in analyzing the 
constitutionality of the INA itself. For example, during the past term 
the Court, in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,28 read the INA’s 
removal grounds to promote clarity regarding the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions, in part to promote fair and 
efficient plea bargaining in the criminal justice system.29 Addressing 
state laws that seek to wrest the initiative in immigration 
enforcement from the federal government, the Court has cautioned 
that such measures could have consequences for trade, investment, 
travel, and diplomacy.30
Collateral impacts have not figured as heavily in assessing the 
constitutionality of federal immigration laws, in part because of the 
historical deference shown to Congress by the courts, which often 
casts collateral impacts as by-products that Congress has duly 
considered and found not to be dispositive.31 However, on the rare 
occasions when the Court has invalidated federal immigration 
statutes, one can find gestures to collateral consequences. In INS v. 
Chadha,32 the Court asserted that permitting a one-house legislative 
veto to overrule executive decisions on immigration relief would 
encourage hasty, heedless, or malicious laws, undercutting the “due 
deliberation” that Hamilton sought in the legislative process.33 In 
28. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
29. Id. at 1568; see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2017) 
(citing Padilla in vacating a plea based on the defendant’s receipt of inaccurate 
information from his lawyer regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction, even when evidence that prosecution would introduce at trial was 
overwhelming); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (holding that 
defendant’s receipt of clear and competent advice about the immigration 
consequences of a plea is one element in effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment); Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and 
Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1057 (2017) 
(noting the Court’s concern for the orderly functioning of criminal justice). 
30. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012).
31. See generally Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
32. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
33. Id. at 947-48 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 458 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)). 
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Sessions v. Morales-Santana,34 Justice Ginsburg supported the 
Court’s invalidation of a gender-based statute on acquired citizenship 
by noting the overall “constraining impact” of gender-based 
stereotypes on human aspirations.35 Shared stewardship would 
promote closer consideration of collateral impacts in assessing the 
scope of Congress’s delegation to the executive branch and in 
constitutional review of immigration statutes, particularly when such 
statutes undermine long-standing reliance interests. 
Courts should also consider whether the power exemplified by 
a challenged action or measure contains a coherent limiting 
principle. The imposition of appropriate “external . . . [and] internal 
controls” that both enable and constrain government is perhaps the 
central project of American constitutionalism.36 Case law on judicial 
deference to Congress regarding immigration too often invokes the 
risks of imposing limits on Congress’s power.37 Here too, however, 
there are glimmerings of a different approach in recent cases. In 
Zadvydas v. Davis,38 the Court cited the Constitution’s abhorrence of 
indefinite detention in holding that the INA permitted only 180 days 
of detention for a former lawful permanent resident (LPR) awaiting 
execution of a final order of removal because of criminal 
convictions.39 To best vindicate the Framers’ vision and extend the 
34. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
35. Id. at 1692-93.
36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (also noting that “[i]n framing a government . . . you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself”). 
37. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
38. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
39. Id. at 682. Cf. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531-33 (2003) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (asserting that mandatory detention of an LPR pending adjudication 
of removability due to criminal convictions was appropriate because the detention 
would typically be for a reasonable period bounded by issuance of a final order of 
removal, but leaving open the legality of protracted detention caused by 
“unreasonable delay” on government’s part). In the October 2017 Term, the Court 
reheard oral argument in a case involving allegations of inappropriate delay pending 
adjudication of removability. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016). This 
Article will not discuss detention in depth since the Court’s decision will surely 
provide insights useful for future commentary. Similarly, this Article will defer 
consideration of whether the Due Process Clause permits restricting the procedural
safeguards that govern removal of foreign nationals who are arriving at a port of 
entry or have recently arrived. Compare Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
835 F.3d 422, 424-28 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (asserting 
that application of minimal safeguards applicable to “expedited removal” is 
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wisdom of cases like Zadvydas, shared stewardship would elevate 
the importance of intelligible limits in determining the level of 
means-end fit required.40
Shared stewardship yields fresh insights on current issues in 
immigration jurisprudence. A shared stewardship analysis would 
find that the indefinite restrictions in President Trump’s EO-3
exceeded the power delegated by Congress to the President. 
Congress’s demarcation in the INA of the United States’ sovereign 
interest hinged on the rejection of discriminatory national origin 
quotas and the prioritization of family reunification.41 Here, EO-3’s 
indefinite restrictions contrast with the temporary pause in that 
measure’s predecessor, EO-2. While EO-2’s brief pause to acquire 
more information42 did not undermine Congress’s comprehensive 
immigration framework, EO-3’s indefinite ban on admission of 
permissible for noncitizens apprehended one mile north of the U.S.–Mexico border), 
with Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes . . . Crowding in Upon Us”: 
The Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan 
Ping, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 185, 193 (2015) (critiquing harshness and risk of error in 
expedited removal). 
40. Intelligible limits may also demonstrate that even when the Court 
reviews a measure under a stricter standard, that measure is narrowly tailored 
enough to pass muster. Shared stewardship would consider this factor at an earlier 
stage, as demonstrating that Congress or the President had shown sufficient self-
restraint to obviate the need for more searching judicial scrutiny.
41. S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 13 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3328, 3332 [hereinafter 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report] (declaring that 
“[r]eunification of families is to be the foremost consideration” in visa allocation 
and rejecting national origin quotas as lacking the “required degree of flexibility” in 
promoting family reunification). 
42. Imperfect information is a perennial issue in immigration law and 
policy. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017) (detailing false 
statements by asylum applicant); see also Martin, supra note 25, at 184 (noting that 
in asylum adjudication “[t]he decisionmaker must learn of events in a distant 
country, as to which few witnesses are likely to be available here, other than the 
applicant himself. This condition could be seen as an opportunity for the applicant, 
permitting him to exaggerate past mistreatment by his home government, or, if he is 
particularly unscrupulous, allowing him to fashion his claim of whole cloth . . .”). 
Relatively few visa applicants may exploit a decisionmaker’s imperfect access to 
information. However, the government’s concern about this issue is not 
unreasonable on its face. Cf. Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and 
Address Fraud Risks, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 3 (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673941.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ4A-4S2L] (noting 
that “asylum officers and immigration judges must make decisions, at times, with 
little or no documentation to support or refute an applicant’s claim. These factors 
create a challenging environment in which adjudicators must attempt to reach the 
best decisions they can with the information available”).  
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nationals from designated countries clashes with the INA’s bar on 
discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas.43 Without 
adequate warrant from Congress, EO-3 installed a Middle Eastern 
variation on the Asia-Pacific triangle quota system that Congress had 
strictly abjured in the landmark 1965 immigration amendments.44
Moreover, as an indefinite ban on entry of nationals of the listed 
countries, EO-3 lacks a limiting principle. No independent review or 
neutral metric would stop this or any other Administration relying on 
a similar theory from decreeing a de facto permanent ban on 
immigration from any country found wanting. That unbridled power 
poses a fundamental challenge to Congress’s comprehensive 
immigration “plan.”
Shared stewardship also provides fresh insight on consular 
“extreme vetting” of visa applicants and retroactive application of 
removal grounds. Under the shared stewardship approach, the broad 
discretion of consular officials becomes a source of concern, 
enabling the evisceration of Congress’s visa priorities. Basic 
procedural fairness emerges as a valuable limit on the otherwise 
limitless discretion that consular officials exercise. Those factors 
lead to a critique of the Court’s decision in Kerry v. Din45 as being 
unduly deferential and point the way toward more searching review 
of the “extreme vetting” that the Trump Administration has 
promoted. 
Shared stewardship also highlights the damage to the 
substantive design of immigration law wrought by retroactive 
application of removal grounds.46 If substantive immigration law 
aims to shape the community in which we aspire to thrive, it should 
reflect abiding values, including due regard for reliance interests. 
Retroactive application unduly discounts the importance of those 
reliance interests. Moreover, the collateral impact of retroactive 
application compounds the “spirit of injustice”47 that Hamilton 
identified with oppressive legislation. The spread of that toxic spirit 
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
44. See 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 41, at 14 
(noting that for several decades prior to passage of 1965 amendments, immigration 
statutes had either absolutely barred the immigration and naturalization of Asians or 
limited all visa applicants of Asian descent—including those who were nationals of 
countries in other regions—to a total of 2,000 visas annually).
45. 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) 
(upholding retroactive application).
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470. 
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deprives noncitizens of the stake they need to make optimal 
contributions to U.S. society. The absence of intelligible limits on the 
harshness of retroactive application, which can lead to the removal of 
longtime legal U.S. residents, further exacerbates the problem.
This Article is in three Parts. Part I discusses stewardship in 
immigration law, combining the Framers’ insights with the wisdom 
of formative cases. Part II discusses the factors driving shared 
stewardship: sovereign interest, collateral impacts, and intelligible 
limits. Part III applies the model to both current and abiding 
immigration problems, including gender-based statutes, judicial 
review of consular decisions, presidential discretion, and the 
retroactivity of removal grounds. In each context, shared stewardship 
seeks to nurture due deliberation on governance by each of the three 
branches. 
I. STEWARDSHIP, GOVERNANCE, AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
IMMIGRATION LAW
Stewardship of an entity often comes down to one person, who 
serves as a managing partner or chief executive. In U.S. political 
history, Theodore Roosevelt’s conception of presidential stewardship 
is the best-known use of the term.48 However, one can also view 
stewardship as a product of collaboration, or even of arms-length 
coordination between different units with overlapping 
responsibilities. A business organization may allocate duties between 
a chief executive officer and a board of directors. In a republic, 
branches with overlapping roles may be said to participate in a 
scheme of shared stewardship.49
48. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1922). Much of 
the following discussion is adopted from Margulies, supra note 7, at 108. 
49. One can argue that this conception merely restates the typical posture of 
each of the three branches in U.S. constitutionalism. This Article’s project is not 
merely to restate the obvious, but to outline how the branches could and should 
coexist in the distinctive domain of immigration law, where precedents often suggest 
that courts play a lesser role than they do in the purely domestic sphere. Similarly, 
because the model advanced here addresses the distinctive challenges posed by 
immigration law, it coincides only in part with the work of scholars who have 
outlined a “fiduciary” theory of democratic governance generally, and judging in 
particular. See generally Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A
Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 701-04 (2013) (discussing the 
concept of judiciary accountability and judicial duties owed to the people). 
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A. The Framers’ Stewardship 
Hamilton alluded to stewardship in a republic when he wrote in 
Federalist No. 23 that “government ought to be clothed with all the 
powers requisite to complete execution of its trust.”50 Based on this 
model, Hamilton recommended that the government receive “the 
most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its 
charge.”51 Confirming the accuracy of the stewardship paradigm, 
Hamilton readily conceded “the responsibility [of the federal 
government] implied in the duty assigned to it”52 and identified the 
federal government as “that body to which the guardianship of the 
public safety is confided.”53
For the Framers, the stewardship metaphor was particularly apt 
because of the fluid nature of threats to the new republic and the 
adjustments expected of officials fulfilling their governmental 
responsibilities. As Hamilton warned, “it is impossible to foresee or 
to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the 
corresponding extent and variety of the means which may be 
necessary to satisfy them.”54 Madison recognized that risks 
proliferated in the domain of foreign affairs. He warned that
safeguards built into the U.S. Constitution will not “chain the 
ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations.”55 While 
the United States and the fifty states that comprise it have a 
monopoly on the use of force within U.S. borders and the ability to 
use compulsory process to arrest lawbreakers on U.S. territory, the 
country must depend on the good will of foreign governments when 
acting abroad. Those foreign regimes may be hostile, fickle, or 
simply unable to help.56 The political branches require some leeway 
in meeting that challenge. 
Nevertheless, Madison’s conviction that the political branches 
needed the means to guard against the “ambition” of hostile or 
50. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 6, at 149. The analysis here 
also owes much to previous work. See Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: 
Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23 (2014). 
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 6, at 151. 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 149.
55. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 15, at 253.
56. See Martin, supra note 1, at 42-44 (noting that “[i]n the international 
arena, U.S. actors generally cannot invoke compulsory process or other reliable 
coercive means under their own government’s control”).
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competing states did not mute his concern with the excessive 
“ambition” of competing branches of the federal government. 
Madison famously designed the distinct but overlapping domains of 
the three branches to ensure that “[a]mbition must . . . counteract 
ambition.”57 In this vein, Madison observed that stewardship also 
required protecting freedom from undue restraints. To defuse this 
risk, Madison advised, “[a] wise nation” will minimize “both the 
necessity and the danger of resorting to [any means] . . . which may 
be inauspicious to its liberties.”58 Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78,
seconded Madison’s point, cautioning against the “ill humors”59
driven by short-term thinking that elevate the fortunes of a faction 
today at the expense of liberty tomorrow.60
Hamilton had a ready remedy for Madison’s concern about 
threats to liberty: review by an independent judiciary. Fortified by 
the “permanency in office”61 and insulation from political pressure 
that lifetime tenure provides, the federal courts could use their 
faculty of sound “judgment”62 to promote the “moderation” needed 
in a republic.63 That mix of checks and balances is important in 
immigration law, despite the integral role in immigration of 
sovereignty and exigency. To further that mix of checks and 
balances, immigration requires a system of shared stewardship 
among the branches. 
B. The Supreme Court Takes a Turn
As an example, consider the Supreme Court’s decision in INS 
v. Chadha.64 In Chadha, the Court struck down an immigration 
provision that permitted Congress to use the so-called legislative 
veto. Under the legislation that the Court invalidated, one house of 
Congress by majority vote could void decisions by the Department 
of Justice that granted individual noncitizens a lawful status.65 In 
57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 36, at 322.
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 15, at 257-58.
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 469.
60. See id. at 470 (noting that the scruples embodied by an independent 
judiciary “operate[] as a check upon the legislative body” by imposing “obstacles to 
the success of an iniquitous intention” and thereby “mitigating the severity” of 
“unjust and partial laws”).
61. Id. at 466.
62. Id. at 469.
63. See id. at 466, 469-70.
64. 462 U.S. 917, 956-59 (1983).
65. Id. at 925 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2)).
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holding that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, the Court 
stressed that this scheme violated the Constitution’s presentment 
requirement, which mandated that legislation be signed by the 
President and subject to presidential veto.66 Exploring the reasons for 
requiring joint action by Congress and the executive branch, the 
Court cited Hamilton’s elaboration of the stewardship rationale in 
Federalist No. 73.67 Hamilton defended presentment to the President 
as promoting “due deliberation” in the enactment of statutes.68
According to Hamilton, the President’s election by the entire country 
would reduce the influence on the chief executive of the locally 
instilled “spirit of faction” that can distort the legislative process.69
By introducing the President—a player without local bias—into the 
legislative mix, the Framers sought to “increase the chances in favor 
of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, 
inadvertence, or design.”70
The Court’s decision in Chadha acknowledges the risks 
inherent in legislative action on immigration.71 Second-guessing 
administrative decisions by a one-house majority could be biased or 
hasty, per the Framers’ fear. Judicial review curbing the one-house 
veto of administrative action was an act of stewardship to temper the 
ill effects that the Framers had sought to prevent.
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Chadha stressed the 
stewardship rationale. Justice Powell suggested that the one-house 
veto, by making it easier for Congress to target individuals whom 
Congress didn’t like, violated the Bill of Attainder Clause.72
Describing the haste of Congress’s action in Chadha’s case, Justice 
66. See id. at 946-47, 958.
67. Id. at 947. 
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961).
69. Id.
70. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947-48 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra
note 68, at 458). Construing the Framers’ vision, Joseph Story, a Justice of the 
Supreme Court and the foremost constitutional scholar of the early nineteenth 
century, observed that 
[p]ublic bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the 
dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and 
impetuous. . . . [A] legislature] . . . rarely has the firmness to insist upon 
holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it 
in all its bearings and relations on society.
Id. at 949-50 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 383-
84 (1859)).
71. Id. at 958-59.
72. Id. at 961-63, 965-66 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Powell noted that the measure’s House sponsors had not even 
distributed the text of the resolution to the entire House membership 
because of time pressure.73 For Justice Powell this jettisoning of 
“normal procedures” increased the risk of “arbitrary and ill-
considered action.”74 The Chadha majority expressed concern that 
once such impulses infiltrated the legislative process, proponents of 
“oppressive” laws would have the upper hand.75 Thwarting this 
ominous trend toward oppressive “efficiency”76 was vital for the 
vulnerable immigrants that Congress might have targeted in the 
measure that the Chadha Court struck down. In addition, the ease of 
second-guessing progressive executive decisions could have injured 
citizens and lawful residents. Invalidating the law spared citizens and 
lawful residents from those dire consequences.
1. Stewardship and Levels of Review
Judicial review under the shared stewardship model often 
entails a key threshold inquiry: determining the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny.77 As in equal protection, probing judicial review 
requires that the political branches show a close nexus between ends 
and means.78 For example, in adjudicating classifications based on 
gender, the Court has required that measures be substantially related 
to achievement of an important governmental objective.79 However, 
in other settings, the Court has been far more deferential, settling for 
a looser connection between government’s goals and the measures 
the political branches have chosen to achieve those ends.80
Determining the level of judicial review is crucial for all 
stakeholders in immigration cases. If review is too searching, the
political branches will be subject to persistent judicial second-
guessing. That paralyzes policymakers and effectively neutralizes the 
73. Id. at 964 n.6.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 947.
76. Id. at 959.
77. Choosing a standard of review was not necessary in Chadha, in which 
the Court merely asked if the legislative veto provisions at issue violated the 
presentment requirement and other constraints on Congress’s authority under Article 
I. Id. at 944.
78. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
79. Id.
80. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(outlining “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard).
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virtues of decisiveness and dispatch that Hamilton identified.81 On 
the other hand, unduly lax judicial review will encourage excess and 
abuse by the political branches that Hamilton branded as inculcating 
a toxic “spirit of injustice.”82 A recurring difficulty in immigration 
jurisprudence is the Court’s inability to coherently explain when and 
why a particular level of judicial review applies to actions by the 
political branches.
The tension between the competing risks of overly intrusive 
judicial review and unduly deferential judicial review reflects 
shifting conceptions of the deliberation that courts should expect of 
the political branches.83 The fit between ends and means is a 
hallmark of deliberation. The Framers were familiar with Aristotle 
and other sources of classical wisdom.84 Aristotle viewed 
deliberation as linked to practical judgment.85 Enlarging on this 
81. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court took this view in a different context 
involving remedies for allegedly inappropriate detention of Muslim immigrants after 
9/11. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2017). Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, 
announced a restrictive test for when the Court would entertain suits for damages 
directly under the Constitution, as it did for law enforcement search and seizure 
excesses in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1851, 1865. Justifying this restrictive test, 
Justice Kennedy warned a looser test for recognizing suits for damages against 
officials in national security cases might “cause an official to second-guess difficult 
but necessary decisions.” Id. at 1861; see also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: 
The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP.
CT. REV. 281, 282 (noting that undue exposure to suits for damages can lead to 
excessive risk aversion by public officials); cf. Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in 
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 195, 202 (2010) (suggesting test for availability of Bivens actions in 
national security cases). My point here is not to justify Abbasi, which takes an 
unduly crimped view of the availability of suits for damages under the Constitution 
as a remedy for official overreaching. See Steve Vladeck, The Incoherence of the 
Normative Case Against Bivens, LAWFARE (June 21, 2017, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/incoherence-normative-case-against-bivens 
[https://perma.cc/QNK3-BYCD]. Rather, I cite Abbasi simply as a recent example 
of reasoning on the costs of judicial remedies in an immigration-related case.
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470. 
83. Scholars have also been resourceful and inventive in framing these 
shifts in structural decisions as a dialectic between rules and standards. See Aziz Z. 
Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 
YALE L.J. 346, 349-51 (2016). 
84. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 203 (Penguin ed. 1990) 
(discussing the familiarity of the American founding generation with classical 
sources). 
85. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 152 (Martin Ostwald trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (“[T]he capacity of deliberating well about what is good and 
advantageous for oneself is . . . typical of . . . practical wisdom.”).
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notion, Aristotle commented that practical wisdom resides in the 
ability to “calculate well with respect to some worthwhile end”86 that 
is “attainable . . . by action.”87
Hamilton’s appreciation of deliberation reflected comparable 
premises. In Federalist No. 23, in extolling the virtues of placing the 
federal government in charge of the national defense, Hamilton 
noted that in any plan for governance, “the means ought to be 
proportioned to the end.”88 Therefore, much depends on the 
closeness of the nexus between ends and means that a court requires.
In this past term, the Supreme Court has endorsed a similar 
practical vision for immigration law. In Sessions v. Morales-
Santana,89 the Court struck down a provision of the INA that 
imposed a gender-based condition on citizenship acquired at birth by 
a child born out of wedlock abroad to a U.S. citizen parent and a 
foreign national.90 The provision that the Court invalidated required 
at least five years of physical presence in the United States for U.S. 
citizen fathers to pass citizenship to children born abroad, while 
requiring only one year of physical presence in the United States for 
U.S. citizen mothers to accomplish the same result.91 According to 
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the opinion of the Court, the provision 
was infirm because it lacked deliberation’s signature nexus between 
means and ends.92 If the end that Congress envisioned was ensuring 
86. Id. at 152.
87. Id. at 157. Aristotle proposed such rules of deliberation in order to curb 
demagogic appeals in ancient Athens, which ironically had as their locus Athenian 
courts. See BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND 
JUDGMENT 121 (2006) (noting Aristotle’s view that the courts were “a forum in 
which . . . leaders would stir up the people”). Requiring a close fit between posited 
ends and the means proposed to achieve those ends is one way that modern courts 
seek to curb contemporary demagogic appeals. 
88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 6, at 153.
89. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
90. See id. at 1682, 1698, 1700-01. In such cases, the U.S. citizen parent 
might be an individual born abroad to married U.S. citizen parents or born in the 
United States to one or more parents who subsequently moved abroad. Id. at 1687-
88 (discussing facts); id. at 1695 n.18 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012)). 
91. See id. at 1686-87. Under the provision relevant to the respondent in 
Morales-Santana, who was born in 1962, Congress required that a U.S. citizen 
father accrue ten years of physical presence in the United States, including five years 
after age fourteen. Id. at 1687 n.3. Congress subsequently amended the law to 
shorten the requirement for fathers to five years, including at least two after age 
fourteen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012); see also id. § 1409(c) (requiring far shorter 
period of presence in the United States for citizen mother). 
92. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (noting that to pass constitutional 
muster, legislation that “differentiates on the basis of gender must show . . . ‘that the 
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that a child born abroad was “American in character” and thus 
worthy of citizenship,93 requiring a substantial period of U.S. 
presence by the parent was a legitimate if somewhat rough measure 
of the parent’s stake in the child’s American identity.94 However, 
requiring a substantial period of U.S. presence for a U.S. citizen 
father but not a U.S. citizen mother “scarcely serve[s] the posited 
end.”95
To illustrate this disparity, Justice Ginsburg compared two 
hypothetical examples. The first was a U.S. citizen mother who had 
been physically present in the United States for the statutory one-
year period at some point prior to her nonmarital child’s birth 
abroad, but never returned to the United States after her child’s birth. 
The second example concerns a U.S. citizen father who at the time of 
the child’s birth abroad is just days short of the substantially longer 
statutory presence period required of fathers and then eventually 
returns to the United States to raise the child.96 The first child 
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth; the second did not. However, as 
Justice Ginsburg noted, this “anachronistic” scheme97 depends on 
one of two attenuated rationales: (1) the premise, so dubious today 
that the government did not advance the argument, that “unmarried 
men take more time to absorb U.S. values than unmarried women 
do,”98 or (2) the assumption that while an unwed U.S. citizen father 
[challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the 
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives’”) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (relying 
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in striking down 
male-only admission policy at Virginia Military Institute)).
93. Id. at 1692 (citation omitted); cf. To Revise and Codify the Nationality 
Laws of the United States into a Comprehensive Nationality Code: Hearings on H.R. 
6127 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong. 43, 431 
(1940) (statement of Richard W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Adviser, State 
Department); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and 
the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2134 
(2014). 
94. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692 (rooting presence requirements in 
reasonable congressional desire to ensure that U.S. citizen parent could “counteract 
the influence of the alien parent”). While one can argue even about the empirical 
soundness of this view, the Morales-Santana Court accepted this logic as an across-
the-board rationale for U.S. residency requirements. Id. at 1695 (accepting, at least 
for purposes of argument, that Congress wished to “serve an interest in ensuring a 
connection between the foreign-born nonmarital child and the United States”). 
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1693.
98. Id. at 1695. 
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needs more time in the United States to counter the “competing 
national influence”99 of the foreign national mother, unwed foreign 
national fathers “care little about, indeed are strangers to, their 
children,”100 thereby requiring far less U.S. presence by U.S. citizen 
mothers as a counterweight to foreign influence.101 The Court 
believed that this stereotype of the absent unwed father was 
inaccurate regarding foreign national fathers, just as it was inaccurate 
for unwed U.S. citizen fathers.102 This “[l]ump characterization”103
lacked the “close means-end fit”104 required by the Equal Protection 
Clause’s deliberative ideal. 
Another decision from this past term, Maslenjak v. United 
States,105 focused on means-end fit as a device for understanding 
legislative intent in an immigration case. The Maslenjak Court 
addressed whether the government had to show that a false statement 
in the course of a noncitizen’s naturalization was “material” in order 
to obtain a conviction.106 Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, 
analyzed the statutory language prohibiting false statements to 
“procure” naturalization.107 According to Justice Kagan, this 
language implied a “means-end relation” between the false statement 
and attainment of the goal of U.S. citizenship.108 Requiring the 
government to show such a “means-end relation” ensured that a jury 
could not convict a defendant for false statements that were 
incidental or irrelevant to obtaining naturalization. For example, an 
applicant for naturalization might lie about a past speeding 
violation.109 Since a speeding violation would not in any case be 
dispositive in this context, such a statement would not materially 
assist in gaining naturalization. At most, it might buttress the 
applicant’s vanity or avoid embarrassment. 
According to Justice Kagan, it was reasonable to assume that 
Congress envisioned a more robust “causal relation”110 between ends 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1693 n.13 (citing studies showing that unwed fathers “assume 
responsibility for their children in numbers already large and notably increasing”). 
103. Id. at 1695.
104. Id. at 1696. 
105. 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1921 (2017).
106. See id. at 1932.
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012). 
108. See Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1925.
109. See id. at 1927.
110. See id. at 1925.
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and means as a predicate for a conviction that could result in jail time 
and revocation of naturalization. The Maslenjak Court attributed to 
Congress a concern for the close fit of ends and means that Aristotle 
and Hamilton saw as integral to deliberation. A more attenuated link 
between ends and means would not fit the model of deliberation that 
the Maslenjak Court read into the immigration statute. 
2. Conflicts and Contradictions in the Current Paradigm
If Morales-Santana and Maslenjak heralded the embrace of 
deliberative means-end rationality that characterizes much non-
immigration adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
account of immigration law reflected in these cases from the Court’s 
October 2016 term might be a tale of triumph for the “normalization” 
thesis, which urges the convergence of immigration with mainstream 
precedent. However, the convergence story does not explain these 
cases. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court in Morales-
Santana, pointedly distinguished the Court’s decision on acquired 
citizenship from decisions involving Congress’s “‘exceptionally 
broad power’ to admit or exclude aliens.”111 In those more deferential 
cases, the Court did not require the familiar means-end fit of 
deliberative rationality. However, while the Morales-Santana Court 
made clear that convergence is not the order of the day, the Court 
was far less clear in articulating the justification for that disparate 
treatment.
In Morales-Santana, Justice Ginsburg cited two decisions 
supporting the downgrading of the means-end fit test in the 
admission of foreign nationals. In Fiallo v. Bell,112 the Court, forty 
years before Morales-Santana, had upheld a provision, since 
amended, that authorized visas for children born abroad out of 
wedlock to mothers who were U.S. citizens or LPRs at the time of 
the visa application. However, the Court did not make visas available 
to similarly situated children of U.S. citizen or LPR fathers.113 The 
Fiallo Court justified a less rigorous standard of review with gender-
based generalizations comparable to the “[l]ump characterization” 
111. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (citing
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 794 (1977)). 
112. See 430 U.S. at 800.
113. See id. at 788-89. The statute had the same impact on visa eligibility for 
foreign national fathers of U.S. citizen or LPR children born out of wedlock. Id. at 
789. 
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that the Court rejected in Morales-Santana.114 In Nguyen v. INS,115
the Court asserted that it was applying the rigorous standard that the 
Court subsequently applied in Morales-Santana in upholding the 
constitutionality of a provision that required that a U.S. citizen father 
acknowledge a child born out of wedlock abroad in order for that 
child to be deemed to have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.116
Justice Ginsburg had joined Justice O’Connor’s vigorous dissent in 
Nguyen,117 in which the nominal standard of review appeared at first 
blush to make little difference; almost a quarter-century after Fiallo,
the Court justified this gender-based disparity with the same gender 
stereotypes that Fiallo had cited.118
Taken together, Fiallo and Nguyen illustrate Morales-
Santana’s lack of a clear justification for distinguishing the acquired 
citizenship at issue in Morales-Santana from the admission or 
exclusion of foreign nationals at issue in Fiallo. First, consider 
Justice Ginsburg’s argument that Congress’s power over admission 
of foreign nationals requires greater deference.119 That reasoning is 
painfully artificial. It is not at all clear why Congress’s power to 
determine which foreign-born individuals acquire U.S. citizenship at 
birth merits less deference than its power to admit or exclude foreign 
nationals. After all, the Court decided in Morales-Santana that 
Congress lacked the power to permit a shorter period of physical 
presence in the United States for the children of U.S. citizen mothers, 
114. Compare id. at 799 (asserting that in excluding fathers Congress was 
motivated by the “perceived absence . . . of close family ties” between fathers and 
children born out of wedlock and with the “serious problems of proof” that “lurk in 
paternity determinations”), with Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1695. Whether or 
not proving paternity was difficult in 1977, it is clearly straightforward in 2017 
because of DNA testing, rendering the “scientific” analysis in Fiallo suspect. 
115. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
116. See id. at 59-60. The statute, still part of the INA, does not require an 
acknowledgment from a similarly situated U.S. citizen mother. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a)(4)(B) (2012).
117. See 533 U.S. at 74.
118. See id. at 66-67 (asserting that the requirement of paternal 
acknowledgment merely ensured that father and child would have the opportunity to 
meet and bond, thus replicating the “opportunity, inherent in the event of birth as to 
the mother-child relationship”). The Nguyen Court asserted that DNA testing was no 
substitute for proof of this parent-child bond, which it viewed as “inherent” for 
mothers but not fathers. Id. at 66. But see id. at 74-97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(critiquing majority’s rationale); see generally Kelly, supra note 22 (criticizing 
influence of stereotypes in the acquired citizenship cases).
119. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1697-99.
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as opposed to fathers.120 That decision had one salient result, at least 
prospectively: More children of U.S. citizen mothers born out of 
wedlock abroad would, in the absence of further congressional 
action, be foreign nationals. Nowhere in Morales-Santana did the 
Court even try to describe why Congress’s power to admit or exclude 
foreign nationals is more worthy of deference than its power to 
choose which individuals born abroad could acquire citizenship. 
This distinction is particularly puzzling because the Constitution 
expressly grants Congress the power to regulate the naturalization of 
noncitizens.121 In contrast, no specific provision in the Constitution 
grants Congress the power to regulate noncitizens’ entry or 
admission.122
Moreover, the Morales-Santana Court failed to acknowledge 
that the mix of citizens and foreign nationals is a zero-sum game. For 
immigration and citizenship purposes, there are only two kinds of 
people: citizens and foreign nationals. If there are more citizens, 
there are fewer foreign nationals to admit or exclude. Conversely, if 
there are fewer citizens, as after Morales-Santana, there are more 
foreign nationals. If Congress has the power to “admit or exclude” 
noncitizens, as Morales-Santana acknowledged, arguably it should 
also have the power to increase or decrease the aggregate numbers
of noncitizens by determining which persons born abroad are in fact 
U.S. citizens.123 In this sense, the Morales-Santana Court’s definition 
of Congress’s power to admit or exclude foreign nationals appears 
arbitrary, formalistic, and a questionable predicate for the Court’s 
distinction between insistence on means-end fit and a more 
deferential standard of review.
Matters do not get clearer with consideration of Nguyen’s 
approach. While the Court purported to apply a less deferential 
120. Id. at 1699-1700.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Admittedly, the naturalization of a 
foreign national is different from the acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth of a 
person born abroad, but the Court has often treated them as springing from the same 
source of congressional authority. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 812, 823 (1971). In 
any case, these two processes for conferring citizenship are surely closer to each 
other than naturalization is to admission or exclusion of foreign nationals.
122. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13-14 (1996); Matthew J. Lindsay, 
Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal 
Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23 (2010); James E. Pfander & 
Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: 
Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 386 (2010).
123. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693. 
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standard in that case, the Court’s reasoning belied that claim. The 
Nguyen Court cited, inter alia, “the importance of assuring that a 
biological parent-child relationship exists.”124 However, as Justice 
O’Connor opined in her Nguyen dissent, these notions were badly 
outdated in 2001125 because of the prevalence of DNA testing. 
Conducting immigration law as if science were stuck in the 1950s is 
not necessary to preserve the design of our immigration laws or react 
to exigency in foreign affairs. It is true that the requirement in 
Nguyen of “acknowledgment” is less onerous than the U.S. presence 
requirement at issue in Morales-Santana.126 However, the Morales-
Santana Court did not justify why that difference in degree was 
significant, if both requirements were products of invidious 
stereotypes, as Justice Ginsburg clearly believed when she joined 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen.127 Perhaps the consequences 
of the stereotyped judgment matter, but apart from asserting that the 
harshness of the consequence made a difference, Justice Ginsburg 
devoted little or no space in her opinion for the Court in Morales-
Santana to explaining why that difference was dispositive. 
In other words, the decisions of the October 2016 term 
demonstrate that distinctions in the degree of deference shown by 
courts still matter in immigration law. However, those decisions shed 
little light on what drives those distinctions. This lack of guidance is 
troubling because of the wide range of contexts in which courts 
encounter immigration measures enacted or implemented by the 
political branches. Shared stewardship provides a more reliable and 
consistent guide.
II. SHARED STEWARDSHIP AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION 
MEASURES
Shared stewardship helps a court determine what level of 
deliberative rationality it should apply to immigration measures. 
124. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
125. Id. at 80 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing “virtual certainty of a 
biological link that modern DNA testing affords”).
126. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694 (describing acknowledgment 
requirement as “easily met”). 
127. See id. at 1693. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Morales-Santana 
seemed to support the continued perception of the gender-based acknowledgment 
requirement as invidious, given the track record of unwed fathers acknowledging 
their children in the United States. See id. at 1693 n.13. If unwed fathers are acting 
like responsible parents, there seems to be little basis for presuming them to be 
irresponsible when the law makes no such presumption for women. See id. 
26 Michigan State Law Review 2018
Requiring a close means-end relation may result in a measure’s 
invalidation, as Morales-Santana indicates.128 On the other hand, 
judicial review that rejects in theory or practice the need for a tight 
means-end fit will fortify the measure against legal challenges, as 
decisions such as Fiallo and Nguyen show.129 Deciding the level of 
deliberative rationality that courts should expect entails three factors 
with roots in the Framers’ thought and in Supreme Court precedent. 
Those factors are: (1) the degree of sovereign interest; (2) the extent 
of collateral impacts on U.S. persons or entities; and (3) the presence 
or absence of intelligible limits on the power of the political 
branches. The test is conjunctive; to trigger more searching review, a 
challenger of government action would have to demonstrate that all 
of the elements are present. I address each in turn.
A. Sovereign Interests: Rhetoric and Reality
Since the Treaty of Westphalia, states have been central players 
in international law. To participate in the community of nations, 
states must be able to exercise certain sovereign imperatives. As we 
shall see below, these imperatives include the power to set criteria 
for membership in the national community and that community’s 
safety and security. These dimensions were understood by the 
Framers. Moreover, each facet has figured heavily in the case law, 
perhaps even to a fault.130
The Framers carefully considered the government’s role in 
regulating immigration in the new republic. They were aware of the 
great international law scholar Emmerich de Vattel’s view that 
control of immigration was a logical corollary to “rights of domain 
and sovereignty.”131 As Vattel noted, “The sovereign may forbid the 
entrance of his territory either to foreigners in general, or in 
particular cases, or to certain persons, or for certain particular 
purposes, according as he may think it advantageous to the state.”132
In Federalist No. 42, Madison vigorously defended the proposal that 
Congress regulate naturalization—the process of granting citizenship 
128. See id. at 1683-84.
129. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 (1977); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 
72-73.
130. See Legomsky, supra note 22, at 263 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
has been too deferential). 
131. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 309 (Béla Kapossy & Richard 
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008).
132. Id.
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to persons born abroad who subsequently entered the United 
States.133 For Madison, a “uniform rule” for naturalization throughout 
the United States was crucial.134 Because citizens enjoyed the 
freedom to travel among the states, permitting each jurisdiction to set 
its own naturalization rules would be a recipe for chaos.135 While the 
Framers’ views and early practice on migration control generally are 
more muddled,136 Madison’s warning on the need for federal 
regulation of naturalization demonstrates that the Framers viewed 
power over immigration as integral to sovereignty.
In The Chinese Exclusion Case,137 the Supreme Court held that 
Congress’s power over the admission of foreign nationals to the 
United States was a core element of U.S. sovereignty.138 To 
demonstrate this point, Justice Field, writing for the Court, alluded to 
threats that a more limited conception of sovereignty could not 
counter.139 Justice Field invoked an account of stewardship that had 
much in common with the Framers’ view. According to Field, the 
“highest duty of every nation” resided in efforts to “preserve its 
independence, and give security against foreign aggression and 
encroachment.”140 Field added that the specter of “aggression and 
encroachment” could arise both from decisions made by foreign 
133. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264-71 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961).
134. See id. at 267.
135. Id. at 270 (warning that if naturalization were done at the state level, a 
state with a need to attract more residents would in effect be able to set 
naturalization standards for all the other jurisdictions, requiring grants of citizenship 
for persons whose conduct was sufficiently “obnoxious”—perhaps including 
commission of crimes—to merit denying naturalization by other states with more 
rigorous standards).
136. See generally Pfander & Wardon, supra note 122; Gerald L. Neuman, 
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833 (1993).
137. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
138. Id. at 603-04 (observing that the U.S. government’s power to “exclude 
aliens from its territory” is not open to question and “is an incident of every 
independent nation . . . [i]f [a nation] could not exclude aliens it would be to that 
extent subject to the control of another power”). Compare Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 127-32
(2002) (critiquing the vision of sovereignty and immigration advanced by Justice 
Field, who wrote for the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case), with Martin, supra 
note 1, at 35-38 (offering qualified defense of portion of holding dealing with 
admission of foreign nationals).
139. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
140. Id.
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governments, such as attacks on the United States, and by 
uncontrolled migration that could consume resources or shift the 
agendas of U.S. officials.141 For Field, addressing either threat was 
fundamental to sovereignty. 
While Justice Field’s view of the relationship between 
immigration controls and sovereignty is primarily defensive—
reasoning backward from potential threats to the powers necessary to 
avert those threats—there is a more positive account of the 
relationship between immigration and sovereignty that is rooted in 
notions of community and membership. This view, most closely 
associated with the contemporary philosopher Michael Walzer, 
views a state as an entity that seeks to form and maintain bonds of 
belonging among persons who participate in the state’s governance 
and culture.142 This conception draws on analogies to family, 
neighborhood, and voluntary organizations.143 Such bonds do not 
necessarily imply that the community must or should be 
homogeneous—indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
birthright citizenship,144 including the children of undocumented 
immigrants, assures that heterogeneity will be the rule. Moreover, 
one could assert that certain criteria for admission of immigrants—
such as those based on gender—are so arbitrary or invidious that 
they are inimical to the community’s identity. In addition, one can 
also argue, despite a long line of Supreme Court cases,145 that once 
the state has admitted a foreign national as an immigrant authorized 
to permanently and lawfully reside in the United States, it would be 
unfair to subject that person to post-admission changes in grounds 
for removal from the country.146 That said, most immigration 
scholars across the ideological spectrum accept that the admittedly 
141. Id. Justice Field’s language was more vivid and arguably invidious, 
conjuring up images of massive migration from Asia that resonated with pervasive 
anti-Asian stereotypes that Justice Field, in his political career, had helped to spawn. 
See id. (expressing fear about “vast hordes” of migrants “crowding in upon us”). Cf.
Cleveland, supra note 138, at 115-16 (discussing Field’s hopes to win the 
Presidency and how his immigration stance complemented those ambitions).
142. See WALZER, supra note 8, at 31-64; Cox, supra note 8, at 371-76.
143. See Martin, supra note 25, at 193.
144. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898). 
145. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952).
146. See Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties”: 
A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 242 (1983) (noting the argument that 
LPRs commit themselves to the U.S. community, thus triggering “mutual 
obligations [that] arise because of physical proximity and a sense of sharing in a 
common enterprise”). 
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arbitrary parameters entailed in sovereignty, such as physical 
borders, give rise to some authority to select attributes among foreign 
nationals applying for admission to that state, including those foreign 
nationals who aspire to permanent membership.
In a constitutional republic or democracy in which popular 
participation is integral to governance, that authority is even more 
important. As Hiroshi Motomura has put it, “[A] democracy must 
have the power to shape and preserve itself as a community of 
individuals who share interests and values.”147 To fulfill those goals, 
“a democracy must have the power to grant or refuse membership to 
newcomers, as well as the power to say that members can do some 
things that nonmembers cannot.”148 The Court’s recent affirmation of 
Congress’s power over the admission of noncitizens149 was surely 
informed by this sense that the power to shape a community’s future 
through such decisions is an important dimension of democratic 
governance.150
If such decisions are essential to democratic governance, they 
should generally be made by the political branches, which are 
majoritarian in character and hence closer to the people, compared 
with the unelected judiciary.151 If the voters believe that Congress’s 
choices about admission criteria are unwise—either because they are 
147. MOTOMURA, supra note 8, at 5. 
148. Id.
149. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
150. Different factions may have different visions of that community, which 
trigger contests in the political arena. For example, some in Congress believe that 
family reunification—a prime imperative for U.S. immigration law for decades—is 
less important than ensuring that the country has an ample supply of foreign 
nationals with skills that are useful for economic development. See Reforming 
American Immigration for Strong Employment (RAISE) Act, S. 354, 115th Cong. 
§ 4(a)(1)(A) (2017) (proposing elimination of immigrant visas for parents of U.S. 
citizens); cf. David Nakamura, Trump, GOP Senators Introduce Bill to Slash Legal 
Immigration Levels, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2017/08/02/trump-gop-senators-to-introduce-bill-to-slash-
legal-immigration-levels/ [https://perma.cc/5G8X-EXCR] (detailing criticism of bill, 
which would reduce legal immigration and shift remaining legal immigration away 
from family-based visas and toward noncitizens who placed high with scoring 
system stressing English proficiency, education levels, and job skills).
151. Justice Jackson articulated this view in Harisiades. See Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (noting that immigration policy is 
“vitally and intricately interwoven with . . . the conduct of foreign relations, the war 
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government” that it is 
“entrusted to the political branches” and “largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference”). See also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (reiterating 
importance of deference).
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too restrictive or not restrictive enough—the people can make their 
own choices at the ballot box. In contrast, because of the federal 
judiciary’s protections, such as lifetime tenure, the people have no 
such leverage over the courts. 
Deference is particularly important for what the Court has 
called “[p]redictive judgment”152 regarding the probability and 
gravity of a risk. In exigent situations, the impact of possible harm 
may be grave, time is of the essence, and probability is often difficult 
to estimate accurately.153 In such situations, the Executive’s ability to 
respond with due Hamiltonian “dispatch”154 is vital. For example, in 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,155 the Supreme Court upheld an EO 
mandating the interdiction of vessels containing Haitians seeking to 
travel to the United States after a coup in Haiti precipitated 
widespread fear of persecution in that country.156 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court, strongly implied that in exigent situations, the 
President’s capacity for quick and comprehensive information-
gathering was owed a measure of deference by the courts. For Justice 
Stevens, the attempted “mass migration[]” of one country’s nationals 
to another country157 without the second country’s prior consent was 
just such an exigent circumstance.
B. Managing Collateral Impacts
Immigration decisions often affect other individuals, entities, 
and institutions beyond the parties to a case.158 Since stewardship 
152. See Dep’t. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
153. See Chesney, supra note 7, at 1380-85. 
154. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 7, at 424.
155. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
156. Id. at 163-66, 188.
157. Id. at 187-88; cf. id. at 185 (quoting Dutch delegate to conference on the 
drafting of the Refugee Convention as asserting, without disagreement from fellow 
participants, that Convention did not impose duties on states regarding “attempted 
mass migration” flows “across frontiers”). 
158. See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism,
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321, 330 (2016) (in environmental context, observing that 
landowner who destroys wetlands generates negative externalities such as increased 
flooding for adjacent landowners; in school financing arena, aggregate effect of 
reducing school funding in individual school districts yields negative externalities 
for society as a whole in the form of a less educated work force); Jonathan S. Masur 
& Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 124-25 (2015) 
(noting that bank runs that put pressure on financial system can result from 
aggregated impact of individual decisions by short-term lenders to call in short-term 
loans; government deposit insurance can ease short-term lenders’ concerns and 
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concerns itself with this broader range of stakeholders, collateral 
impacts should be central. Moreover, collateral impacts can be 
intangible, encompassing harm to reliance interests or the narrowing 
of perspectives caused by gender bias.159
The Supreme Court, as we have already seen, has frequently 
cited potential collateral impacts in immigration cases. In Plyler v. 
Doe,160 the Court warned that state laws prohibiting undocumented 
children from attending public schools would exacerbate the larger 
social problems of crime and unemployment.161 Collateral impacts 
have also been key in so-called “crimmigration” cases, in which the 
Court has analyzed the interaction of the immigration and criminal 
justice systems.162 The Court has enhanced clarity on what criminal 
convictions trigger an LPR’s deportation. That clarity vindicates 
reliance interests and minimizes the adverse effects that uncertainty 
would trigger for the functioning of criminal justice.163
prevent bank runs, but can result in different negative externality of “moral hazard” 
in which lenders make unduly aggressive loan decisions knowing government will 
bail them out because they are too big to fail; and cascade of bad loans leads to 
financial crisis).
159. See generally Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
160. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
161. Id. at 230. Cf. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) 
(asserting that overzealous enforcement of immigration law by state law 
enforcement officials acting without federal guidance may adversely affect U.S. 
trade, capital from foreign investors, and revenue from foreign tourism).
162. See Cade, supra note 29, at 1057; see generally Juliet Stumpf, Fitting 
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009).
163. See Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017). In Lee, the 
Court cited a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment in vacating the defendant’s plea to possessing the drug ecstasy with 
intent to distribute. The defendant’s lawyer had failed to inform the defendant that 
plea would lead to removal. Id. at 1965. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, 
noted that “[t]he decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the 
respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea.” Id. at 1966. The 
petitioner, Chief Justice Roberts observed, viewed avoiding removal as “the 
determinative factor.” Id. at 1967. Since the defendant faced near-certain removal 
pursuant to the plea bargain offered by the prosecution, and the defendant therefore 
had nothing material to lose, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “common sense,” id. at 
1966, would dictate that such a defendant reject the plea and instead opt to throw a 
“Hail Mary” pass at trial. Id. at 1967. Vacating Lee’s plea vindicated his reliance 
interest in receiving competent legal advice on the consequences of a plea deal. Id.
at 1962.
Encouraging defense lawyers’ diligence on immigration consequences 
serves the interests of efficient criminal justice adjudication by maximizing the 
chances for a defense attorney to bargain successfully with the prosecution for a plea 
that avoids the defendant’s removal. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 
32 Michigan State Law Review 2018
Immigration actions that injure reliance interests can also have 
negative collateral impacts. Concern with reliance interests is as old 
as the Framers. Hamilton wrote of the corrosive effect on individual 
initiative of government measures that reflected a “spirit of 
injustice.”164 In a prescient discussion, Hamilton warned that 
impinging on reliance interests for short-term gain can have grave 
long-term effects.165 Hamilton posited an ideal—the “[c]onsiderate” 
person,166—who understands that while a shortsighted government 
policy may make her “a gainer today,” the same individual may by 
“tomorrow [be] the victim of a spirit of injustice.”167 That volatility 
has spillover effects for the entire polity. As Hamilton remarked, the 
“inevitable tendency of . . . a spirit [of injustice] is to sap the 
foundations of public and private confidence and . . . introduce in its 
stead universal distrust and distress.”168 The moderating “temper” of 
(2010) (observing that stakeholders’ knowledge of immigration consequences of
pleas may promote “agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties”); 
Cade, supra note 29, at 1057 (noting that the Court has “encourag[ed] actors in . . . 
criminal proceedings to evaluate the potential immigration consequences in their 
framing of charges, pleas, and sentences”). From this perspective, the approach in 
Lee will reduce adjudication costs over the long haul, thus minimizing the adverse 
impact of removal grounds on the administration of criminal justice. Cf. Esquivel-
Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017) (noting that the Court employs a 
“categorical approach” to assess whether criminal convictions render a noncitizen 
removable; looking to the necessary elements of the crime under the governing 
statute rather than at “specific facts underlying the crime” promotes certainty, 
predictability, and uniformity, rather than relegating defendants to guesswork). 
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
165. Hamilton’s discussion does not single out concern about reliance
interests. However, the status of reliance interests, including those of good-faith 
holders of title to land pursuant to the treaty with Britain that ended the 
Revolutionary War, was a salient issue in a celebrated case that Hamilton 
successfully litigated in New York prior to the Constitution’s enactment that 
presaged the advent of judicial review after the Constitution’s ratification. See 
Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor’s Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 392, 393 (Julius Goebel, 
Jr. ed., 1964); cf. Daniel M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The 
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 963-66 (2010) (discussing significance of 
Rutgers v. Waddington for judicial review in the United States); Peter Margulies, 
Defining, Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material 
Support and Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1, 18-19 (2013) (same).
166. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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the courts169 is therefore a crucial element in maintaining 
stewardship.
Early immigration cases demonstrated a keen appreciation for 
Hamilton’s insight. In Chew Heong v. United States,170 the Supreme 
Court construed a restrictive immigration statute targeting Chinese 
lawfully residing in the United States as operating prospectively.171
Echoing an approach pioneered by Hamilton in the pre-Constitution 
case, Rutgers v. Waddington,172 the elder Justice Harlan, writing for 
the Court, cited the U.S. treaty with China ratified prior to the 
statute.173 That treaty permitted Chinese nationals lawfully working 
in the United States to travel to China and then return to the United 
States “at their pleasure.”174 Although the Court had already 
recognized that Congress can legislate inconsistently with treaty 
obligations when it states its intent clearly, Harlan found the statute 
unclear and therefore read it as being consistent with the “inviolable 
fidelity” owed treaties under international law.175 In arriving at this 
interpretation, Harlan rejected a contrary reading of the statute that 
would have excluded Chinese laborers who had left the United States 
temporarily pursuant to the treaty and then sought readmission 
without a certificate that Congress had subsequently required of 
returning Chinese laborers. 
According to Harlan, retroactive application of the certificate 
requirement would have violated not only the United States’ treaty 
with China, but also canons of construction disfavoring retroactivity. 
As Justice Harlan explained, to prevent unfair surprise, protect 
reliance interests, and ensure that “rights previously vested are [not] 
injuriously affected,” courts will require a clear statement that 
Congress wishes to give a statute affecting such rights retroactive 
effect.176 Taking this view, Justice Harlan reiterated, guarded against 
the violation of “previously acquired rights”177 and all the ills that the 
Framers ascribed to that breach of trust. 
169. Id.
170. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
171. Id. at 538.
172. See THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 165, at 
392.
173. Id. at 393.
174. See Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 550.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 559.
177. Id. at 560.
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In analyzing statutes in which Congress clearly stated its intent 
to require retroactive application, the Court has unfortunately not 
followed Chew Heong v. United States. Indeed, the Court has 
repeatedly stated since shortly after Chew Heong was decided that 
deportation is not a criminal punishment and the Constitution’s Ex 
Post Facto Clause therefore did not apply to removal grounds 
enacted into law after an act of a noncitizen that triggered 
removability under the new law.178 In this line of cases, the Court has 
failed to heed Hamilton’s warning about the corrosive impact of the 
“spirit of injustice” caused by oppressive legislation.179 This Article 
will argue that the Due Process Clause should be read as barring 
such statutes.180 However, while the Court has declined to read the 
Constitution as forbidding retroactive application of removal 
grounds, in statutory interpretation it has nonetheless followed Chew 
Heong and consistently read ambiguous statutes as purely 
prospective in application.181
In these statutory cases, the Court has continued to 
acknowledge the concerns that Hamilton articulated about unfair 
legislation. In INS v. St. Cyr,182 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, 
explained that the presumption against retroactivity is rooted in 
“[e]lementary considerations of fairness [that] dictate that individuals 
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform 
their conduct accordingly.”183 In noting the “timeless and universal 
human appeal”184 of this notion, Justice Stevens observed that 
retroactive legislation had two serious collateral impacts. First, 
implicitly echoing Hamilton’s concern about the “ill humors” that 
178. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
179. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
180. See infra notes 401-26 and accompanying text.
181. See Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 261 (2012); cf. Daniel 
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About 
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1898-99, 1908 (2000) 
(explaining political and legal dynamics of harsh immigration laws and suggesting 
appropriate judicial responses); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive 
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 153-54 
(1998) (arguing that the Constitution forbids retroactive application); see generally 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549-50
(1990) (arguing that courts have relied on statutory interpretation to smooth hard 
edges of plenary power doctrine).
182. See 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
183. Id. at 316 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 
U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
184. Id. (quoting Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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can drive pernicious legislation185 and Chadha’s concern with the 
wages of legislative haste,186 Justice Stevens cautioned that 
retroactive legislation could be a “means of retribution against 
unpopular groups or individuals.”187 Moreover, Justice Stevens 
added, retroactive legislation deprives people of “confidence about 
the legal consequences of their actions.”188 Just as Hamilton 
predicted that unfair laws would “sap the foundations of public and 
private confidence,”189 the Court warned that retroactive application 
would cut against the grain of a “free, dynamic society”190 and 
suppress “creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors.”191
Vigilance regarding similar collateral impacts is a vital component of 
shared stewardship. 
C. Intelligible Limits: Self-Imposed Controls by the Political 
Branches
Shared stewardship also considers whether the political 
branches have provided intelligible limits to their assertions of 
power. Courts distrust a government position that fails to indicate 
clear limits.192 On the other hand, a diligent attempt by government 
to limit its own power can mark a particular unit in government as a 
good steward that does not require judicial assistance. 
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
186. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983).
187. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315; cf. id. at 315 n.39 (citing Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and 
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2000)) (discussing noncitizens’ 
inability to vote and resulting lack of political power to contravene this tendency).
188. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 
244, 265-66 (1994)).
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
190. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66).
191. Id.
192. This search for articulable limits is a ubiquitous aspect of judicial 
reasoning. Cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38 
(2001) (discussing judicial focus on practical implementation of constitutional 
norms and values); Chesney, supra note 7, at 1362-64 (explaining the need for 
articulable and manageable rules); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1291-92 (2006) 
(discussing how the Court shapes doctrine to ensure that it can apply manageable 
standards to evaluate government action); see generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing 
importance of viewing separation of powers disputes in light of Framers’ plan for a 
“workable government”).
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The Framers stressed the importance of articulable limits on 
government. Madison’s structural focus on ensuring that “ambition 
. . . [would] counteract ambition” between the branches193 is but the 
most celebrated example. Hamilton’s praise for judicial review as 
obliging a hasty or iniquitous legislator to “qualify”—i.e., limit—
efforts to pass unjust laws194 is in much the same vein. 
This search for intelligible limits has been crucial to the 
Supreme Court’s approval of measures in regarding national 
security. For example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,195 the 
Court noted, in the course of upholding a statute that barred material 
support of foreign terrorist groups, that Congress had to some degree 
tailored the statute to First Amendment concerns, by not including 
domestic groups.196 Furthermore, Congress only prohibited aid to the 
group, not more generic activity designed for public consumption, 
such as journalism, scholarship, or human rights monitoring, which 
might have conferred an occasional incidental benefit on a DFTO.197
Similarly, in United States v. United States District Court (Keith),198
in the course of holding that warrantless wiretapping of alleged 
domestic national security threats violated the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court suggested in dicta that its reasoning only applied to the 
domestic realm; the Court declined to opine on the role of the Fourth 
Amendment in surveillance of purely foreign individuals or 
entities.199 In the Article III cases, the Court has assessed the 
constitutionality of certain non-Article III tribunals established by 
Congress that lacked the safeguards of federal courts, such as 
lifetime tenure. The Court has been far more likely to uphold 
193. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 36, at 322.
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 471.
195. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
196. Id. at 35 (noting that the statute at issue applied only to “foreign terrorist 
organizations” and that a “limited number” of such groups are designated as such by 
the Executive Branch pursuant to the statute).
197. Id. at 31-33, 36-40.
198. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
199. Id. at 321-22 (stressing that the Court’s holding “involves only the 
domestic aspects of national security,” not the “activities of foreign powers or their 
agents”); id. at 322 n.20 (citing sources suggesting that warrantless surveillance 
might be permissible in latter case); cf. Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United 
States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287, 300-01 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. 
Bradley eds., 2009) (noting that Justice Powell, who wrote the Court’s opinion in 
Keith, had served on an American Bar Association committee that issued a report 
that Justice Powell cited for the proposition that warrantless wiretapping was 
permissible with respect to foreign powers).
Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty 37
Congress’s handiwork when those tribunals operated only in cabined 
areas, such as territorial courts, courts martial, or the efficient 
resolution of financial matters that the federal government could 
plainly regulate.200
In the immigration realm, a similar impulse has long been 
influential. In an early case, Wong Wing v. United States,201 the Court 
held that the imprisonment at hard labor for up to one year of a 
Chinese national not lawfully entitled to reside in the country was 
impermissible without an indictment by a grand jury and a judicial 
trial.202 In so holding, the Court rejected the government’s argument 
that both the offense designated by Congress and the sentence 
prescribed in the statute were analogous to vagrancy offenses, which 
at that time did not require the safeguards described above.203 The 
Court rejected this analogy as not providing sufficient limits on the 
political branches’ power, just as the Court rejected the analogy to 
temporary detention pending adjudication of a foreign national’s 
removability.204 While detention for this limited purpose was 
appropriate,205 the Court in Wong Wing rejected detention with a 
punitive purpose imposed after a finding of removability. The 
inability to cabin such a claimed power was a substantial factor in 
the Court’s reasoning.206
200. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
855-56 (1986) (noting narrow spectrum of claims that agency, in place of state or 
federal court, could adjudicate); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973) 
(holding that Congress could create non-Article III courts in the District of 
Columbia to adjudicate “strictly local” issues, but suggesting in dicta that the 
outcome would have been different if Congress had sought to create non-Article III 
courts to adjudicate matters of “constitutional and . . . general concern”); Glidden 
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-47 (1962) (discussing Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s justification for permitting non-Article III territorial courts); cf. Stern v. 
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 493-94 (2011) (citing forum’s lack of limits in invalidating 
provision of bankruptcy law that permitted non-Article III tribunal to hear tort 
claims).
201. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
202. Id. at 238.
203. Id. at 234, 238. 
204. Id. at 235-36.
205. Temporary detention prior to adjudication was merely an incident of 
removal proceedings, akin to holding certain criminal defendants without bail if a 
court determined that they presented a flight risk. See id. at 235. Such a remedy 
merely ensured that the proceeding would be completed, and prevented the subject 
of the proceeding from undermining the purpose of the proceeding by fleeing the 
jurisdiction. 
206. Cf. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957) (ruling that 
power to question a foreign national subsequent to entry of final order of removal 
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In a more recent decision, Zadvydas v. Davis,207 the Court cited 
the absence of limits in setting the maximum period that the 
government could detain a noncitizen who was already subject to a 
final order of removal.208 The Zadvydas Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Breyer, found that the government lacked the power to detain 
noncitizens in this posture for longer than six months. According to 
Justice Breyer, that window of time was the maximum time the 
Constitution permitted for the government to show that the actual 
physical removal of the noncitizen was reasonably likely, given 
countervailing factors such as the refusal of the noncitizen’s country 
of origin to agree to his or her return.209 Justice Breyer rejected the 
government’s argument that neither the INA nor the Constitution 
imposed a limit on post-final order detention.210 He asserted that 
accepting this argument would amount to sanctioning “indefinite” 
detention and thus would raise substantial questions of 
constitutionality.211
D. Summary
In sum, shared stewardship hinges more searching review on 
whether the political branches have shown themselves to be fit 
stewards in the immigration realm. That inquiry does not depend on 
the policy merits of a challenged measure, or on precise accounting 
was limited to questions regarding the noncitizen’s readiness to appear for execution 
of the removal order and did not extend to free-floating questions about the 
noncitizen’s associations and relationships).
207. 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001).
208. Id. at 701-02. 
209. Id. at 689.
210. Id. at 690. 
211. Id. at 689. Justice Breyer also noted that the government’s proposed 
construction of the statute authorizing post-final order detention was not limited to 
certain classes of noncitizens, such as “suspected terrorists,” but instead applied to 
any noncitizen “ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist 
visa violations.” Id. at 691. In addition, the Court noted that under the government’s 
reading the noncitizen could seek relief against excessive detention only in 
administrative proceedings, which were not subject to “significant . . . judicial 
review.” Id. at 692. These multiple failures to impose limits helped persuade the 
Court that the government’s position was not consistent with the statute or the 
Constitution. Cf. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (asserting that mandatory detention of an LPR pending adjudication of 
removability due to criminal convictions was appropriate because the detention 
would typically be for a reasonable period bounded by issuance of a final order of 
removal, but leaving open the legality of protracted detention caused by 
“unreasonable delay” on government’s part). 
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of the measure’s ultimate means-end fit. Rather, the model asks 
whether the challenged measure demonstrates that the political 
branches have acted with the heedful perspective on governance that 
the Framers envisioned. The indicia of sovereign interest, collateral 
impacts, and intelligible limits provide signposts in that key inquiry. 
To ensure that judicial review is not unduly intrusive, the test is 
conjunctive; the challenger will have to show that each element cuts 
against the claims of adequate stewardship made by the political 
branches. If the challenger can show each element, the degree of 
means-end fit required will be such that virtually any measure will 
fail the test. However, if the challenger cannot show each element, 
the looser fit required will, in the multi-variable realm of 
immigration law, almost always lead to upholding the measure 
challenged. The best test for the model itself is its work in practice.
III. APPLYING THE SHARED STEWARDSHIP MODEL
A model is only as good as the justification it provides in the 
real-world arena of longstanding problems encountered by the 
courts. This Part applies the shared stewardship model to four 
important issues in immigration law: gender-based criteria in 
admission and citizenship; vetting of visa applicants by consular 
officials; presidential power over immigration; and retroactive 
application of grounds for removal. I discuss each in turn.
A. Gender-Based Criteria
The Court’s decision this term in Sessions v. Morales-Santana 
struck down a gender-based statutory provision on acquired 
citizenship that had become increasingly difficult to justify. 
However, the Court’s rationale for distinguishing the measure 
invalidated in Morales-Santana from other gender-based measures 
that the Court had previously upheld was short on persuasive force 
and normative coherence. The shared stewardship model seeks to 
remedy that deficit. 
First, the model would straightforwardly acknowledge that the 
sovereign interest of the United States in such distinctions is low. As 
Justice Ginsburg eloquently noted in Morales-Santana, the Court has 
repeatedly and with good reason expressed skepticism about gender 
distinctions in almost every other sphere of American law.212 None 
212. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2017).
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cope with exigent circumstances or contribute in an appreciable way 
to a vision of membership in the national community that is anything 
more than arbitrary. The presence of gender-based distinctions in any 
nook or cranny of immigration and citizenship law is at best an 
awkward anachronism, and at worst an ongoing reproach that the 
court and the political branches are not doing their jobs in a 
constitutional republic. 
Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg lucidly explained in Morales-
Santana, gender-based distinctions have adverse collateral effects 
that are severe, albeit intangible in character. For example, Justice 
Ginsburg recognized that “[o]verbroad generalizations . . . have a 
constraining impact.”213 In purporting to distinguish between the 
respective predispositions of men and women toward nurturing the 
young, rules embodying such stereotypes may “create a self-
fulfilling cycle of discrimination that force[s] women to continue to 
assume the role of primary family caregiver.”214 These rules also 
send a constraining signal to men who hope to transcend stereotypes 
through the “exercise [of] responsibility for raising their children.”215
Ensconced in the august provinces of the U.S. Code, such provisions 
send an inauspicious message about gender equality, independent of 
their impact on the parties. 
The criterion that makes the difference for the level of means-
end fit required is the presence of intelligible limits. Justice Ginsburg 
was correct in Morales-Santana to describe the parental 
acknowledgment requirement upheld by the Court in Nguyen as
“minimal”216 and “easily met.”217 Viewed from an ex ante 
perspective, fathers who wish to ensure that their children can be 
deemed to have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth need only provide 
a sworn writing acknowledging paternity before the child reaches the 
age of eighteen.218 While not everyone potentially affected by this 
provision has read it or is knowledgeable about its content, ignorance 
of the law may extend to any provision of the U.S. Code. In 
providing for the simple expedient of a sworn acknowledgment and 
allowing the better part of twenty years after the child’s birth to 
fulfill this criterion, Congress has shown a willingness to operate 
213. Id. at 1692-93.
214. Id. (citing Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 
(2003)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
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under intelligible limits that demonstrates adequate stewardship. 
Viewed under the less demanding standard that the Court applied in 
practice in Nguyen, the provision passes muster. The more onerous 
requirement of years spent in the United States in Morales-Santana 
showed no similar sense of limits and thus merited the more 
searching scrutiny that the Court employed. 
A lack of limits also marked the since-repealed exclusion from 
visa preferences of children born out of wedlock to U.S. citizen or 
LPR fathers. At the time that the Court decided Fiallo v. Bell, the 
INA included severe restrictions on the admission of most 
individuals who were not considered “Immediate Relatives”—
spouses, “children,” and certain parents—of U.S. citizens or LPRs.219
Other relatives would be subject to onerous quota limits that entailed 
lengthy waits.220 To get a sense of the multi-year waits in store for 
persons not in the Immediate Relative category, consider the current 
situation of offspring over twenty-one years of age, whom the INA 
refers to as “unmarried sons [or] daughters.”221 The priorities for 
admission of this group reflect Congress’s view that reunification of 
adult children with U.S. citizen or LPR parents is less pressing than 
reunification of minor children with their parents.222 The respective 
waits for an unmarried son or daughter of a citizen223 or LPR224 are 
substantial: Under current conditions, the wait will be a minimum of 
almost seven years, and a maximum of over twenty years.225 Those 
219. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 789-90 (1977).
220. Id. The INA also required adult relatives not included in the Immediate 
Relative category to undergo labor certification—a lengthy and selective process 
that determines whether a noncitizen abroad has distinctive job skills that will assist 
U.S. employers while not displacing U.S. workers. Id. To get a sense of the multi-
year waits in store for persons not in the Immediate Relative category, consider the 
current situation of offspring over twenty-one years of age, whom the INA refers to 
as the “unmarried sons or daughters” of citizens, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (2012), or 
LPRs, § 1153(a)(2)(B).
221. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2014) 
(discussing this category in the INA).
222. Id.
223. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1).
224. Id. § 1153(a)(2)(B).
225. See Visa Bulletin for July 2017, 10 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_July2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4AH-UTY5] (listing visa applications that are now considered 
“current” from most countries for entry into the United States as those filed in either 
December 2010 (for unmarried sons or daughters of U.S. citizens) or November 
2010 (for unmarried sons or daughters of LPRs); for Mexico, a high-immigration 
country, the wait is much longer (January 1996 for the unmarried sons or daughters 
of citizens)). 
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waits are too protracted to qualify as intelligible limits. The provision 
upheld in Fiallo demonstrates a degree of heedlessness unworthy of 
the fit steward.226 That concern, not the longstanding but mechanical 
distinction between acquisition of citizenship at birth and admission 
of noncitizens cited by the Morales-Santana Court, should have 
prevailed in Fiallo.
B. “Extreme Vetting”: The Reviewability of Consular Decisions 
While Congress generally sets criteria for the admission or 
exclusion of foreign nationals, the State Department’s overseas 
consular officers determine whether individual noncitizens fit within 
these criteria.227 The “extreme vetting” that President Trump has 
indicated will follow and supplement his Executive Orders would 
occur at the consular level. A shared stewardship approach would 
require a closer means-end fit for some consular processing 
procedures, including those that U.S. officials implement as part of 
the Trump Administration’s “extreme vetting.”
Legislation, case law, and practical necessity have coalesced to 
cede a substantial measure of discretion to U.S. consular officers 
processing noncitizens’ visa applications. Even though Congress 
mandated in 1965 that no person should be “discriminated against”228
regarding issuance of an immigrant visa, Congress subsequently 
explained that nothing in the nondiscrimination provision would 
restrict the Secretary of State’s authority over procedures applicable 
to visa processing.229 As recently as 2015, a concurring opinion by 
Justice Kennedy reiterated that in this area, Congress had “assigned 
discretion to the Executive.”230
The practicalities of visa processing make some form of 
deference inevitable. U.S. consular officials process millions of visa 
applications every year.231 In the course of this demanding endeavor, 
U.S. officials determine whether foreign nationals qualify for family-
226. Under the law in place at the time Fiallo v. Bell was decided, the only 
way to avoid similar protracted waits was for the citizen or LPR father to marry a 
citizen or LPR and persuade his spouse to petition for his son or daughter as a 
“stepchild.” See Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
227. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). 
229. Id. § 1152(a)(1)(B). 
230. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972)).
231. Cf. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2197-99 (2014) 
(discussing procedure for processing certain family-based immigrant visas). 
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based immigrant visas, based on claimed relationships with close 
U.S. relatives; immigrant employment visas, based on a foreign 
national’s skill and ability to fill a market niche in the United States 
without displacing U.S. workers;232 and nonimmigrant student and 
tourist visas. In addition, U.S. consular officials must determine 
whether a visa applicant is inadmissible for one or more of a plethora 
of grounds listed in the INA, including health factors, public safety, 
and national security.233 An unduly low threshold for judicial review 
of consular officials’ work would inhibit timely visa processing and 
exponentially increase the workload of the federal courts.234
All that said, the Supreme Court has recently opened the door a 
crack on reviewing visa processing; the shared stewardship approach 
would open the door wider, although only in reviewing procedures to 
ensure basic fairness. In Kerry v. Din, the concurrence opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy assumed without deciding the issue that 
a U.S. citizen had an interest cognizable under the Due Process 
Clause in the fair and accurate processing of her Immediate Relative 
petition for her spouse.235 A U.S. consulate in Pakistan had denied 
her petition, citing the INA provision excluding persons who have 
engaged in “terrorist activities.”236 However, the consulate gave no 
further explanation237 of the facts supporting the denial or even of the 
specific statutory subsection among the ten included in the provision, 
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b). 
233. Id. § 1182.
234. Cf. Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F.3d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that 
“for more than a hundred years courts have treated visa decisions as discretionary 
and not subject to judicial review for substantial evidence and related doctrines of 
administrative law”).
235. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Alito. 
Having assumed that due process applied, Justice Kennedy then found that the 
government had already provided due process to the noncitizen. Id. at 2141. Justice 
Kennedy thus concurred in the result reached in Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia had found that due process 
did not apply at all because within the framework of immigration law, in which 
Congress had plenary power over admission of noncitizens, the U.S. citizen sponsor 
had no cognizable liberty interest in association with her noncitizen spouse. Id. at 
2134-36. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, 
dissented. The four dissenting Justices would have held both that the U.S. citizen 
sponsor had a cognizable liberty interest and that the government had failed to 
provide Din with the process she should have received. Id. at 2141-42.  
236. Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)). 
237. Id.
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which with applicable cross-references include “dozens” of possible 
reasons.238
In determining that the consulate’s failure to give more specific 
reasons did not violate due process (even assuming due process was 
applicable), Justice Kennedy applied the test that the Supreme Court 
had articulated in the 1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel239 regarding 
a First Amendment challenge to a visa denial: whether the 
government had provided a “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
justification.240 Determining that the consular decision met this 
standard, Justice Kennedy cited the long tradition of deference to 
consular decisions, the risk of inappropriate disclosure of U.S. 
intelligence sources and methods, and the noncitizen visa applicant’s 
history of work for the Taliban government in Afghanistan.241 While 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the noncitizen’s ministerial work 
for the Taliban might well be “insufficient” in itself to support the 
visa denial, he asserted that it at least showed a “facial connection to 
terrorist activity.”242
A shared stewardship approach would have required more 
searching judicial review of the consular office’s refusal to provide 
more specific reasons for the denial. First, the collateral impact of 
this decision on a U.S. citizen was substantial and grievous—the 
U.S. citizen sponsor here was deprived of the ability to live in the 
United States with her spouse. Moreover, the consulate’s refusal to 
give reasons lacked an intelligible limiting principle. Consider the 
consulate’s refusal to provide the U.S. citizen petitioner with the 
specific statutory subsection that supported the denial of her 
application. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the aggregated 
subsections within the “terrorist activity” inadmissibility section 
“cover a vast waterfront” of conduct.243 The absence of any factual 
explanation plus the plethora of acts potentially covered by the 
terrorist activity bar conferred vast discretion on the consular officer 
and forced the petitioner and her spouse to guess about how to 
respond. If due process requires an effective opportunity to counter 
238. Id. at 2145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
239. 408 U.S. 753, 754 (1972).
240. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
241. Id. at 2140-41.
242. Id. at 2141. The noncitizen had apparently worked as a clerk for the 
Taliban government. Id. at 2146 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
243. Id. at 2146 (citing, inter alia, Singh v. Wiles, 747 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 
1227 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (alleging that noncitizen had engaged in material support 
of terrorist organization by offering its members lodging on the floor of a temple)). 
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adverse decisions with evidence and argument, the general denial 
that Justice Kennedy endorsed substantially reduced this 
opportunity.244
Nor would a fuller explanation have impaired Congress’s 
design or hindered the executive branch’s ability to respond to 
exigencies abroad. While protection of sources and methods is a 
legitimate concern under the INA and in other contexts, the facts of 
the case provide little support for Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that 
a fuller explanation would have revealed sources and methods. The 
consulate could have provided a fuller explanation merely by citing 
the applicant’s work as a clerk for the Taliban and classifying that as 
material support of a terrorist group.245 That explanation would at 
least have provided the petitioner and the applicant with enough 
information to attempt to counter the denial, perhaps by showing that 
the applicant had worked for the government before the Taliban took 
power and had no other affiliation with them, had done only 
ministerial work required of any clerk, and had not known of or 
participated in any violent activities. Providing this information 
would have enhanced the statute’s design by supplying all 
stakeholders with clearer information on the architecture of 
Congress’s choices.246
Moreover, providing more information to visa applicants about 
reasons for a denial can also enhance responses to exigent situations 
abroad. In Din or similar cases, incorrect information may have 
244. Id. at 2144-45.
245. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012) (defining specific acts that 
constitute engaging in terrorist activity).
246. Justice Kennedy noted that Congress had expressly exempted visa 
denials based on terrorism or national security concerns from a requirement that the 
government provide a visa applicant with the relevant specific provisions on 
inadmissibility. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3)). However, this provision does not mandate that the 
government withhold such information; it merely states that the general default 
disclosure requirement does not apply. See § 1182(b)(3). Moreover, even if the 
statute required withholding this information, shared stewardship would nonetheless 
require disclosure under most circumstances. One can envision situations where 
concern for sources and methods would permit nondisclosure of certain information 
supporting a visa denial. For example, a rejected visa applicant would not be entitled 
to disclosure of the identity of informants who had cooperated with consular 
officials. However, the government should have to provide more support than it did
in Din for the claim that mere disclosure of a statutory subsection will out a 
government informant. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2132 (plurality opinion). 
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triggered the denial.247 Terrorist watch lists often include significant 
errors, with ineffectual procedures for correcting the record.248 If visa 
processing includes access to such material, “garbage in” may yield 
“garbage out.” Giving an applicant more information about the basis 
for a denial may flush out such mistakes. Maintaining incorrect 
information in U.S. government databases can waste officials’ time 
and effort and distract officials from worthy leads. Reducing those 
costs enhances U.S. security.
The above analysis also suggests a concern with vetting 
procedures for all countries that the Trump administration put in 
place after the issuance of EO-2.249 One worry is that the vetting 
procedures will be discriminatory, raising renewed concerns about 
compliance with § 1152(a)(1)(A), which bars discrimination.250 A
related concern is that the procedures will be unduly cumbersome 
and intrusive. For example, consular officials may be instructed to 
put all visa applicants from particular countries into the Security 
Advisory Opinion (SAO) process, which entails additional layers of 
screening.251 That alone will add months to visa processing. 
Similarly, consular officials might be instructed to ask intrusive 
questions about Sharia law, allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, or 
knowledge of U.S. history or civics. The former questions, because 
247. See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Visa Security Tracking System,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 7 (Aug. 27, 2009), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ice_vsptsnet.pdf (noting 
possibility of inaccurate information) [https://perma.cc/998T-KQPD]. While the 
citizen sponsor in Din did not dispute that her spouse had worked for the Taliban as 
a clerk, consular officials could have based the denial on other material. See Din,
135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although Justice Kennedy viewed that 
fact as a sufficient basis for finding the denial to be bona fide, Justice Kennedy may 
have attached undue weight to this single factor. See id. 
248. See Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Latif 
v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141-43 (D. Or. 2014); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Irina D. Manta 
& Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 1313, 1326 
(2016) (discussing litigation over no-fly lists); Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in 
National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1599 (2016) (discussing problem of 
inaccurate information and insufficient opportunity to correct the record); cf.
Abdelfattah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 529-31, 536-39 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (describing lawful-resident Plaintiff’s suffering of repeated security checks 
that may have been prompted by incorrect information in government databases and 
holding that Plaintiff could seek relief under U.S. law).
249. See generally EO-2, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
250. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing privacy impacts 
of SAO process). 
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they single out a particular religion to which a majority of a given 
state’s nationals belong, might well be discriminatory under 
§ 1152(a)(1)(A), and might also be the kind of institutionalized
preference for one religion over another that should trigger more 
searching scrutiny.252
The collateral impact of such visa obstacles on U.S. sponsors is 
substantial, since those persons will have to endure additional delays 
in being reunited with close relatives. Leeway about procedures 
under section 1152(a)(1)(B) should not become a license for 
procedures that are discriminatory, intrusive, or unduly dilatory.253
One way of addressing this would be to require a certification that 
the consular official has a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that 
seeking an SAO is appropriate. If necessary, a court could consider a 
submission of such information in camera.254 Another alternative, 
based on the treatment of removal under Zadvydas, would be to 
establish a presumptively reasonable period—say six months or 180 
days—for the duration of processing.255 Beyond this period, a delay 
in processing would be considered presumptively not bona fide or 
legitimate. 
Other aspects of visa processing may also be excessive under
the INA. For example, the Trump Administration has announced that 
it will require certain visa applicants to produce substantially more 
information in the course of consular processing, including five years 
of social media platforms and identifiers (“handles”) and fifteen 
years of residential addresses and employment records.256 That 
period of time seems unduly burdensome and lacks a clear limiting 
principle. Many people will not have records that go back that far. 
Retrieving all the information required will be difficult, if not 
impossible, requiring each visa applicant to become an amateur 
detective. Moreover, each piece of information may produce 
additional delays, as consular officials scrutinize inconsistencies and 
omissions. That process may result in visa processing grinding to a 
halt. Such procedures might be appropriate for a targeted subset of a 
252. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
253. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
254. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).
255. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
256. Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2-3, 
http://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/amresource/DS5535.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYD-
BYAV] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018); Carol Morello, Some Visa Applicants Are Asked 
for Social-Media Names, WASH. POST, June 2, 2017, at A03.
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given country’s nationals, if other information regarding those visa 
applicants suggests a heightened risk of terrorist activity. However, 
broad-brush application of such procedures could have a substantial 
collateral impact, amounting to a de facto cessation in visa 
processing. 
Broad-brush use of these burdensome procedures would also 
not serve U.S. sovereign interests. It would not enhance consular 
officials’ ability to respond to exigent circumstances beyond the 
ability available through more tailored inquiries. Moreover, 
unchecked vetting would also upset the carefully wrought design of 
the INA, triggering § 1152(a)(1)(A), the INA’s nondiscrimination 
provision.257 Under a shared stewardship model, courts should 
require that the Executive demonstrate a closer means-end fit for 
“extreme vetting” of this type. 
C. Executive Orders and Actions on Immigration 
As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged,258 courts have 
often accorded a measure of deference to the Executive regarding 
national security and foreign affairs.259 In the immigration context, 
courts have generally displayed deference both when construing a 
statutory delegation to the President260 and in considering the 
interaction of executive action and constitutional norms.261 Yet, 
judicial deference has never been absolute.262 Because of its clash 
257. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
258. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017). The Court fashioned 
its stay of President Trump’s second travel ban in IRAP after appellate courts largely 
upheld the injunctions entered below. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th 
Cir. 2017); IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017); cf. Hawaii v. Trump, 
No. 17-17168, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 26513, at *13-14 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) 
(invalidating EO-3 as contrary to INA).
259. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010)) (noting that “[t]he interest in preserving national security is 
‘an urgent objective of the highest order’”); id. at 2089 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 307 (1981)) (noting that in context of equitable balancing required for stay 
of decision below regarding the admission of refugees with no previous ties to the 
United States, “the balance tips in favor of the Government’s compelling need to 
provide for the Nation’s security”). 
260. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 158 (1993).
261. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972).
262. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (holding that 
executive branch could not detain noncitizens subject to final orders of removal 
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with the text, structure, and purpose of the INA, deference is 
inappropriate for EO-3, the indefinite ban announced by President 
Trump in September 2017 on entry of most immigrants and certain 
nonimmigrants from specific countries.263
1. President Trump’s Measures Regarding Entry of Foreign 
Nationals: Factual Background 
In 2017, President Trump took three distinct actions regarding 
entry of foreign nationals. He issued an EO in January (EO-1), a 
revised EO (EO-2) in March, and a Proclamation in September (EO-
3).264 The first EOs were temporary, while EO-3 is indefinite in 
duration, subject to internal review every 180 days.265 As we shall 
see, the indefinite character of EO-3 tips it over the edge into conflict 
with the INA. Before explaining that conclusion, it will be useful to 
set out the factual background of each of the three measures and—by 
way of contrast—briefly discuss the legal merits of now-expired EO-
2.
In late January 2017, President Trump issued EO-1, 
temporarily suspending entry of foreign nationals from seven 
countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—
and all persons granted refugee status abroad.266 The EO suspended 
entry for the seven-country nationals for ninety days, and entry of 
refugees for 120 days.267 The original order encompassed current 
visa-holders (VHs), such as doctors or students returning from 
holiday break abroad.268 The order also did not expressly exempt 
returning LPRs.269 As a result, airports became sites of chaos, as VHs 
and others were detained and in some cases summarily removed 
when there was no reasonable prospect of physically returning those individuals to 
their country of origin). 
263. See EO-3, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
264. See generally Exec. Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017)
[hereinafter EO-1]; EO-2, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); EO-3, 82 Fed. Reg. 
45,161.
265. See EO-1, § 3, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8,978; EO-2, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13,212
(Mar. 6, 2017); EO-3, § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,169.
266. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017).
267. Id.
268. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2017).
269. See id. at 1165 (finding that the EO did not expressly exempt LPRs and 
that subsequent statements by White House Counsel disclaiming intent to include 
LPRs did not bind the Executive). 
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despite lawful commitments in the United States, such as enrollment 
in colleges and service at U.S. hospitals.270
After the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against EO-1, 
President Trump issued EO-2 in early March. EO-2 stated that the 
pause in admissions was designed to “improve . . . screening and 
vetting protocols,” as well as protocols for visa and refugee 
processing,271 and ensure that inadequately screened or vetted 
persons did not enter the United States as that review took place. In 
addition, the revised EO expressly exempted LPRs and current VHs, 
took Iraq off the list of countries whose nationals were affected, and 
instituted a waiver program for refugees based on the “national 
interest,” compliance with international agreements or 
understandings, hardship, and other factors.272
After decisions by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that in large 
part upheld injunctions entered against the revised EO, the Supreme 
Court in June issued a per curiam stay of the injunctions.273 That stay 
exempted from the revised EO foreign nationals with a “bona fide 
relationship” with a U.S. person or entity.274 Clarifying its order in 
July, the Supreme Court held that the term, “bona fide relationship,” 
included a broad range of relatives, including parents, children, 
spouses, siblings, in-laws, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, 
nieces, and nephews, but did not include the refugee resettlement 
agencies that had entered into sponsorship agreements regarding 
particular persons abroad already granted refugee status.275 However, 
after issuance of EO-3, the Supreme Court ruled that the challenges 
to EO-2 filed in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits were moot. The Court 
also vacated the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ decisions. 
270. See id. at 1157.
271. See EO-2, § 1(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
272. See id. § 3(a), at 13,213 (exemption of LPRs); id. § 3(b)(i), at 13,213 
(exemption of VHs); id. § 1(g), at 13,211 (list of nations affected); id. § 6(c), at 
13,215 (waiver provisions); id. § 6(b), at 13,216 (lowering refugee cap).
273. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017).
274. Id. at 2088. Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, 
dissented from the portion of the stay order granting this relief to noncitizens 
otherwise affected by the revised EO. Id. at 2090 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
275. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34, 34 (2017); Peter Margulies, 
Refugee EO Update: The Supreme Court Hands Each Side a Partial Victory,
LAWFARE (July 19, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/refugee-eo-update-
supreme-court-hands-each-side-partial-victory [https://perma.cc/8C79-734W] 
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s July 19 order); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
49, 49-50 (2017) (staying injunction that had barred implementation of EO-2 for 
refugees whose only tie to the United States was through resettlement agency); 
Trump v. IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 353, 353 (2017) (vacating decision below as moot).
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Because the earlier EOs were temporary, President Trump 
issued EO-3 in September 2017.276 In contrast to the earlier EOs’ 
temporary duration, EO-3 is indefinite in duration, although it is 
subject to review every 180 days.277 In addition to being indefinite in 
duration, EO-3 makes some changes to the mix of listed countries 
and to the categories of foreign nationals from those countries 
affected by the measure. It suspends entry of both immigrants and 
some or all classes of nonimmigrants from Chad, Iran, Libya, North 
Korea, Syria, and Yemen.278 The administration dropped Sudan from 
the list. In addition, EO-3 bars the entry of immigrants from Somalia, 
subjects Iraqi nationals to heightened screening, and bars 
nonimmigrant entry of certain Venezuelan government officials and 
their families.279 To provide some room for official discretion despite 
the restrictions, EO-3 also provides a waiver process, which requires 
a foreign national otherwise covered by the EO to demonstrate that 
the bar to entry would result in undue hardship, that she does not 
present a threat, and that her entry would be in the national 
interest.280 EO-3 does permit the admission of most refugees281 and 
students, who receive nonimmigrant visas.
2. President Trump’s Measures in Statutory Context
Under the INA, the legality of President Trump’s measures 
restricting entry hinges on reading the INA as a “harmonious 
276. See generally EO-3, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
277. See id. § 4, at 13,215. 
278. Id. § 1(g), at 13,211.
279. Id. §§ 1(g), 2(h)(ii), 2(f)(i), at 13,211-13. 
280. Id. § 3(c), at 45,168. In December 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a 
Hawaii district court’s injunction against EO-3. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673 
(9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 U.S. Lexis 759 (Jan. 19, 2018); see also 
International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 
3513 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (affirming Maryland district court’s injunction against 
EO-3). Earlier in December, the Supreme Court—without opining on the merits—
stayed all injunctions against EO-3 pending further review at the Court. See Trump 
v. IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 542, 542 (2017). 
281. President Trump also issued a new Executive Order on refugees that 
was accompanied by a memorandum that allegedly suspended refugee admissions 
and related immigration from several countries, including some also listed in EO-3. 
See generally Doe v. Trump, No. C17-0178, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211377 (W.D. 
Wa. Dec. 23, 2017) (invalidating provisions of refugee Executive Order and 
accompanying memorandum that imposed categorical per-country limits on refugee 
admissions and admission of close relatives accompanying or “following to join” 
refugees).
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whole.”282 That inquiry starts with three subsections that I detail 
below. However, the inquiry ultimately involves a broader 
consideration of the INA’s structure and purpose. 
The first provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (the “entry provision”), 
authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any 
class of aliens” when that entry is “detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.”283 This provision, enacted during the Cold War as 
part of the 1952 Immigration Act, was intended as a delegation to the 
Executive to limit the admission of persons or groups that might 
endanger U.S. security.284 In a 1986 opinion, then-judge Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg characterized the President’s authority under § 1182(f) as 
“sweeping.”285 Reinforcing the Executive’s discretion in visa 
processing, in 1996 Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) (the 
“procedures provision”), which empowers the Secretary of State to 
“determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa 
applications,”286 including the location mandated for filing particular 
documents. 
282. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 
(2000).
283. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2013). 
284. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1993) 
(upholding order authorizing interdiction at sea of foreign nationals seeking to enter 
the United States without a legal status); see generally Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 
745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that regulation requiring all postsecondary 
students who were natives or citizens of Iran report regarding their status was 
constitutional as response to Iran’s seizure of U.S. embassy in Tehran); see also 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1507 (11th Cir. 1992) (asserting that 
§ 1182(f) “clearly grants the President broad discretionary authority to control the 
entry of aliens into the United States”); Sesay v. INS, 74 Fed. App’x 84, 86-88 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (deferring to administrative decision that appellant was not eligible for 
asylum because presidential proclamation under § 1182(f) precluded his entry into 
United States); cf. Kate M. Manuel, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 3-12 (2017) (discussing background and past practice 
regarding § 1182(f)). The Supreme Court has also asserted in dicta that the power to 
exclude foreign nationals is granted by Article II of the Constitution. See United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (asserting that 
“exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty . . . stem[ming] not alone 
from legislative power but . . . inherent in the executive power to control the foreign 
affairs of the nation”).
285. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Similar 
authority resides in 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), which states that it is “unlawful . . . to 
depart” or enter the United States except pursuant to “reasonable rules [and] 
regulations” promulgated by the President. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (2012).
286. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) (2012); see Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. 
Dep’t of State, 104 F.3d 1349, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that Secretary of State 
had authority under this provision to prospectively require filing of certain 
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However, the text, structure, and legislative history of the INA 
also curb the President’s discretion. In the groundbreaking 1965 
Immigration Act, Congress added an anti-discrimination provision 
declaring that no individual shall “be discriminated against in the 
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, 
nationality, place of birth or place of residence.”287 The exceptions to 
the anti-discrimination provision are narrowly crafted.288 Congress 
placed the nondiscrimination provision in the vital portion of the 
statute that sets overall limits on annual legal migration to the United 
States.289 Moreover, Congress in the 1965 amendments to the 
immigration statute stressed the importance of family reunification 
and a pivot from the discriminatory national origin quotas that had 
shaped prior immigration law.290 In addition, Congress has prescribed 
detailed provisions for the admission of nonimmigrants such as 
students, tourists, and business visitors.291 Congress carefully 
calibrated these nonimmigrant provisions to optimize the benefits to 
Vietnamese asylum applications at consulates located in countries to which 
applicants had been repatriated after initial negative screening, rather than in Hong 
Kong). This decision was the culmination of extensive litigation, including an 
argument in the Supreme Court prior to Congress’s adding the “procedures” 
provision to clarify the law. Id. at 1350-51; see also Josh Blackman, The Legality of 
the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part I: The Statutory and Separation of Powers 
Analysis, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Mar. 11, 2017), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/03/11/the-legality-of-the-3617-executive-order-
part-i-the-statutory-and-separation-of-powers-analyses/ [https://perma.cc/4254-
P497] (discussing course of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers litigation under “National 
Origin Discrimination” heading, including government’s discussion at Supreme 
Court of need for executive discretion and Congress’s role in overriding earlier 
decision that curbed that discretion). In the litigation concerning Vietnamese asylum 
seekers, the D.C. Circuit ultimately held that the designation of specific consulates 
for receipt of Vietnamese asylum applications did not constitute prohibited 
discrimination. See Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 104 F.3d at 1353 (holding that, 
given Congress’s enactment of “procedures” provision, it was “clear” that the 
nondiscrimination provision did not bar the procedural decisions made by the 
Secretary of State in that case). 
287. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
288. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(D) (2014) (certain overseas employees of 
the U.S. government, including certain Taiwanese nationals), id. § 1101(a)(27)(E)-
(G) (certain Panamanian nationals who performed work in the Panama Canal Zone 
before or at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 ceding ownership of the 
canal to Panama).
289. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (setting per-country level at seven percent of total 
annual global immigration level for the family preference, employment, and 
diversity immigrant categories).
290. See infra notes 312-26 and accompanying text.
291. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2015).
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the country yielded by each kind of nonimmigrant. An indefinite bar 
to entry of certain nonimmigrants upsets Congress’s comprehensive 
framework. 
Reading § 1182(f) in light of the INA as a whole suggests 
sensible limits on the President’s authority. Section 1182(f) is 
interstitial in character. It allows the President to act quickly and 
decisively when situations require an exigent response.292 Under this 
conception, temporary action will often be permissible. However, 
indefinite or permanent actions require a more substantial 
justification since those actions are more likely to interfere with the 
INA’s overall plan. 
3. An Interstitial Use of Statutory Authority: EO-2 and 
Congress’s Framework
EO-3’s predecessor, March 2017’s EO-2, differed substantially 
from EO-3 in temporal scope. While EO-3 is indefinite in duration—
albeit subject to review every 180 days—EO-2 was temporary.293 Its 
per country limits lasted only ninety days, while its bar on admission 
of refugees lasted 120 days. The limited duration of EO-2
harmonized it with Congress’s plan. 
Recall that under the shared stewardship model, a court will 
require that a challenged government action exhibit a close means-
end relation if that action: (1) does not serve the sovereign interests 
of the United States, (2) imposes collateral impacts on U.S. persons 
or institutions, and (3) has no limiting principle.294
Even in the absence of presidential action under § 1182(f), the 
ordinary working of immigration law provides rudimentary security 
safeguards when an immigrant seeks admission to the United States 
at a port of entry such as an airport or border crossing. For example, 
suppose an arriving noncitizen has a valid visa as an Immediate 
Relative of a U.S. citizen. As mentioned in our earlier discussion of 
consular processing and “extreme vetting,” to grant that visa, a 
consular official abroad would have had to also find that the 
noncitizen was not excludable for any of the reasons set out in the 
INA, such as commission of crimes abroad, the likelihood of 
requiring public assistance, having a communicable disease such as 
292. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2013).
293. See EO-2, § 1(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Cf. EO-
3, § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,169 (Sept. 24, 2017).
294. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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tuberculosis, or a history of material support of foreign terrorist 
groups.295 Nevertheless, despite this consular determination of 
eligibility, an immigration official in the course of inspection at a 
point of entry may determine that the noncitizen is inadmissible 
based on new data or facts that the consular official missed.296
The President’s power to deny “entry” under § 1182(f) gives 
the President authority to address threats in a fashion that is more 
tailored and proactive than the statutory bases for exclusion in the 
INA itself.297 However, past practice illustrates that presidents have 
used the power granted by § 1182(f) in a tailored, often temporary 
way. Presidents have invoked § 1182(f) against relatively discrete 
groups, such as associates of the former Panamanian leader, Manuel 
Noriega.298 Presidents have also used § 1182(f) to address exigent 
situations in foreign affairs. For example, President Carter invoked 
the provision in order to require all Iranian postsecondary students in 
the United States to report after the Iranian government held U.S. 
Embassy personnel as hostages in 1979.299 President Reagan invoked 
§ 1182(f) to halt most otherwise-eligible Cuban nationals’ entry into 
the United States after Cuba reneged on an immigration accord.300 In 
addition, as the Supreme Court discussed in Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council, presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill 
Clinton invoked § 1182(f) to interdict inadmissible foreign nationals 
on the high seas heading for the United States.301 No prior President 
had used § 1182(f) to indefinitely restrict the entry of otherwise 
admissible nationals from multiple named countries, as President 
Trump has sought to do.
Against this backdrop, the temporary bar to entry in EO-2
narrowly passed muster under shared stewardship, largely because of 
its temporary nature. Consider the sovereign interests factor. 
According to EO-2, the pause was designed to prevent further 
admissions based on information that was not fully reliable, while 
agencies such as the State Department, the Department of Homeland 
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
296. See generally id. (detailing grounds of inadmissibility). 
297. See id. § 1182(f).
298. See Manuel, supra note 284, at 10.
299. See Brief for Immigration Scholars at 24-29, Hawaii v. Trump, 878 
F.3d 662 (2017) (No. 17-17168) (discussing past practice regarding § 1182(f)).
300. See Manuel, supra note 284, at 10. Presidents Carter and Reagan 
tailored their decrees to exempt close relatives of U.S. citizens. See IRAP v. Trump,
2018 U.S. App. Lexis 3513, at 128-29 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018).
301. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 160-67 (1993). 
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Security, and the Director of National Intelligence conducted a 
“worldwide review” to determine what, if any, additional 
information would be required from all or some foreign countries to 
ensure that a visa applicant was not a “security or public-safety 
threat.”302 According to EO-2, each listed country was “a state 
sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist 
organizations, or contains active conflict zones.”303
Turbulent country conditions can substantially impair refugee 
and visa processing. When conditions are difficult, the information 
deficits that complicate consular decisions and refugee 
determinations304 become even more difficult to manage. For 
example, turbulence may snarl access to records that substantiate a 
visa application. As decision-makers working without documentation 
rely more on applicants’ own accounts, the risk of unreliable 
narratives increases. The Supreme Court’s decision in Maslenjak v. 
United States305 demonstrates that asylum claimants are not always 
reliable narrators. In Maslenjak, an asylum applicant egregiously 
misrepresented facts, casting her spouse as a victim of persecution 
when in fact the applicant’s spouse was complicit in horrendous 
atrocities.306 Cases like Maslenjak illustrate that the effort to improve 
screening is not inherently unreasonable or invidious. Nor is a pause 
in entry to ensure proper screening of visa applicants from the 
countries subject to such turbulent conditions on the ground. 
A pause of reasonable duration would also be consistent with 
shared stewardship’s search for limiting principles. EO-2’s stated 
duration of ninety and 120 days for six-country nationals and 
302. EO-2, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,212 (Mar. 6, 2017).
303. Id. § 1(d), at 13,210. See also id. § 1(e)(ii), at 13,211 (“Libya is an 
active combat zone, with hostilities between the internationally recognized 
government and its rivals. In many parts of the country, security and law 
enforcement functions are provided by armed militias . . . Violent extremist groups, 
including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have exploited these 
conditions . . . The Libyan government provides some cooperation with the United 
States’ counterterrorism efforts, but it is unable to secure thousands of miles of its 
land and maritime borders, enabling the illicit flow of weapons, migrants, and 
foreign terrorist fighters.”).
304. See Martin, supra note 25, at 184.
305. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017).
306. Id. (holding that trial judge had delivered improper instruction in trial of 
defendant on making false statements to obtain naturalization, and noting that 
defendant had lied to obtain asylum by asserting that her husband had sought to 
avoid being drafted into the Bosnian Serb Army in the early 1990s and had suffered 
persecution as a result, while in fact her husband had been an officer in a unit that 
helped massacre 8,000 Bosnian civilians).
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refugees, respectively, demonstrated its limited scope. In its stay 
order, the Supreme Court announced that it “fully expect[ed]” that 
the government would finish its review and relay any new 
requirements to foreign governments within the brief “life” of EO-
2.307 The Court’s language strongly suggested that it would not 
regard the “worldwide review” rationale as a colorable justification 
for a new EO of the same scale or for seriatim temporary reviews.
Without a fresh rationale, shared stewardship would find that any 
new, similar EO lacked an intelligible limiting principle.
Although collateral impacts alone will not invalidate a measure 
under a shared stewardship test, the collateral impacts of EO-2 were 
nonetheless substantial. As the Supreme Court’s stay order 
upholding portions of the injunctions against the revised EO made 
clear, EO-2 had significant adverse consequences for U.S. persons. 
Without the Court’s modifications exempting from the EO 
grandparents, grandchildren, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, 
and other relatives of U.S. persons,308 EO-2 would have adversely 
affected U.S. relatives of noncitizens, who would have had to endure 
delay in reuniting with family members.309 Moreover, although the 
Court’s orders regarding EO-2 did not reflect this,310 U.S. refugee 
resettlement agencies providing sponsorship assurances to refugees 
also suffered, since their operations and funding were interrupted.311
307. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017). 
308. See id. (ruling that noncitizens abroad otherwise affected by refugee EO 
were exempted if they had “bona fide relationship” with U.S. person or entity); see 
also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34, 34 (July 19, 2017) (clarifying scope of stay 
order). 
309. The family members abroad, as foreign nationals with no other ties to 
the United States, lack constitutional rights. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (holding that noncitizens abroad with no ties to the United 
States lacked Fourth Amendment rights). The Supreme Court has held that foreign 
nationals detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba—a facility under the 
exclusive control of the U.S. military—have access to habeas corpus. See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008). Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1861-62 (2017) (citing Boumediene as connoting limits on the deference 
accorded political branches’ decisions about national security and foreign affairs). 
The foreign nationals covered by the revised EO are not detained by the United 
States. Therefore, holding that they are directly protected by the U.S. Constitution 
would require an expansion of the Court’s holding in Boumediene.
310. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 34 (declining to include refugee resettlement 
agency assurances in category of “bona fide relationship” with U.S. person or entity 
that under stay order required exemption from revised EO). 
311. See Alex Aleinikoff, What Does the Supreme Court’s Decision on the 
Trump Executive Order Mean for Refugees?, PUB. SEMINAR (June 27, 2017), 
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4. The Perils of Indefinite Executive Measures: The INA and 
EO-3
In September 2017, EO-2 gave way to EO-3. The latter’s 
indefinite restrictions contrast sharply with EO-2’s temporary 
duration. In addition to imposing collateral impacts that are far more 
severe than EO-2’s, the indefinite character of EO-3’s restrictions 
undermine the sovereign interests articulated in the INA’s “overall 
scheme” and lack any coherent limiting principle.
Consider EO-3’s clash with Congress’s scheme. The 
transformational 1965 Immigration Act amendments had two salient 
features: They abolished the discriminatory national origin quotas
that had marred U.S. immigration law for four decades and 
prioritized family reunification. The INA sets out a detailed 
architecture for immigrant admissions that prioritizes close family 
relationships.312 As the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee noted in its 
report on the 1965 amendments, the revisions to the statute included 
a “new system of allocation based on a system of preferences which 
extends priorities . . . to close relatives of U.S. citizens and [LPRs],” 
along with certain “members of the professions, arts, and sciences,” 
those with skills or other attributes needed in the U.S. economy, and 
refugees.313 In crafting a new system, the Committee’s Report 
declared that “[r]eunification of families is to be the foremost 
consideration.”314 Thus, in setting criteria for membership in the U.S. 
community, Congress sought to serve the interests of U.S. citizens 
and LPRs with close family members overseas. 
By the same token, the 1965 amendments decisively rejected 
the system of national origin discrimination that had governed the 
issuance of immigration visas since 1924.315 These quotas governed 
all areas of the world, apart from the Western Hemisphere.316
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Congress’s own 
experience demonstrated that the quota system lacked the “required 
http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/06/what-does-the-supreme-courts-decision-on-
the-trump-executive-order-mean-for-refugees/#.WaQDXj6GOpo [https://perma.cc/
3ENZ-U6WQ] (arguing that the equitable balancing required in a stay order should 
also respect the importance of refugee resettlement agency assurances to overall 
refugee processing). Cf. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087 (outlining standard for stay 
pending appeal) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009)). 
312. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153 (2012). 
313. See 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 41, at 11. 
314. Id. at 13. 
315. See id. at 11-12. 
316. Id. at 12-13.
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degree of flexibility” to “permit the reuniting of families.”317 Because 
of this shortcoming, the Committee noted, Congress had, in the past, 
resorted to “special legislation” to be appropriately “generous and 
sympathetic” to families’ needs.318 The continued resort to such 
special legislation since 1952 accounted for the admission of nearly 
two-thirds of all immigrants entering the United States.319 In sparing 
Congress from the need for this continual and disruptive recourse to 
special legislation, the Judiciary Committee pointedly praised the 
1965 amendments’ replacement of the national origin quota system 
with a family-based visa program that was to be “fair, rational, 
humane, and in the national interest.”320
The 1965 Judiciary Committee Report also stressed the 
particularly adverse impact of quota provisions governing the so-
called Asia-Pacific triangle, which included China, Japan, Korea, 
and other countries. Until 1952, racial restrictions in the immigration 
statute had barred naturalization of most Asian noncitizens and 
suppressed immigration.321 The 1952 statute, while eliminating race 
as a bar, subjected nationals from the Asia-Pacific triangle to 
particularly narrow and rigid quotas. A total of only 2,000 visas per 
year were available to the aggregate of all countries in the region.322
Moreover, the 1952 Act also provided that the immigration to the 
United States of persons of Asian ancestry anywhere in the world 
would count against the 2,000-person quota applicable to the Asia-
Pacific triangle. In other words, persons of Asian descent who were 
nationals of countries in other regions, such as Europe, Africa, the 
Caribbean, or Latin America, had to fit within the 2,000-person 
Asian-Pacific triangle quota.323 The 1965 amendments repealed all 
vestiges of this noxious system.324 The Judiciary Committee report 
317. Id. at 13.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 14. 
322. Id.
323. Id. at 14-15. A few years before the 1965 amendments, Congress 
removed the 2,000-person limit. However, it continued to subject immigration of 
persons of Asian descent anywhere in the world to the limits of the new Asian-
Pacific triangle quota. Id.
324. Id. at 15.
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declared that in the future, there would be “no differentiation”325 in 
the treatment of Asian immigrants.326
The 1965 legislation and other subsequent amendments also 
consolidated the grounds for excluding foreign nationals from the 
United States. Over time, the list of grounds for inadmissibility has 
grown to include many factors, ranging from traditional factors like 
likelihood of becoming a public charge327 to the various terrorism 
exclusions discussed by the Supreme Court in Kerry v. Din.328
Although the list has grown, Congress deliberated over all additions, 
including the terrorism provisions added after September 11. 
The “entry provision” cited by President Trump, § 1182(f), is 
part of the statutory section that deals with grounds for 
inadmissibility.329 In times of crises or transnational disputes, 
§ 1182(f) allows the President to fill gaps, acting interstitially to 
supplement the express exclusion grounds in the statute or identify 
particular individuals or groups whom consular processing might not 
flag or whose entry might undermine other foreign policy goals.330
However, the logic and structure of Congress’s detailed 
inadmissibility provisions suggest that Congress has not delegated to 
the President the power to create new standing additions to the 
exclusion grounds. The de facto addition of exclusion grounds by 
executive order would not fall under the rubric of statutory 
implementation or enforcement. Instead, it would amount to 
redrafting the statute itself.
EO-3 also exceeds the power delegated by Congress to set 
“procedures” for visa issuance.331 The “procedures” provision was a 
legislative response to particular litigation involving the Secretary of 
State’s power to designate consulates for the receipt of Vietnamese 
asylum claims.332 The “procedures” provision would allow the 
325. Id.
326. See Alan Hyde, The Nondiscrimination Obligation of Immigration and 
Nationality Act Section 202(a)(1)(A) 1, 13, 18 (Rutgers Univ. School of L., Soc. Sci. 
Research Network, Working Paper No. 2932605), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932605 [https://perma.cc/AR56-K76R] (providing analysis 
of the nondiscrimination provision in the INA). 
327. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2013).
328. Id. § 1182(a)(3); see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131, 2140 
(2015).
329. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
330. Id.
331. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
332. See Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 104 F.3d 1349, 
1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Blackman, supra note 286. 
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government to obtain additional information from visa applicants. 
For example, the administration could have established tailored 
procedures that addressed potential information deficits by requiring 
more explanation or documentation, including certifications by 
government agencies in the applicant’s country of origin or affidavits 
from government officials. Further information requirements, such as 
the disclosure of social media “handles” for some visa applicants, 
might be appropriate to ensure that there is no evidence of 
inadmissibility based on terrorist ties or other factors. However, EO-
3 goes well beyond setting procedures. It categorically bars virtually 
all eligible applicants from most listed countries from receipt of 
immigrant visas and some nonimmigrant visas. The possibility of a 
shortfall in information about some visa applicants does not justify a 
de facto material alteration in the INA’s underlying substantive 
criteria for visa eligibility and admission to the United States. The 
“procedures” provision is too slender a reed to do this heavy work.333
EO-3’s provision of waivers does not remedy its clash with the 
INA. To obtain a waiver, a noncitizen from the affected countries 
must show that: (1) denying entry would cause the noncitizen “undue 
hardship”; (2) entry would not pose a threat to the United States; and 
(3) entry would be “in the national interest.”334 The waiver’s test also 
undermines the INA’s framework. Consider the second criterion: 
requiring the noncitizen show he or she is not a threat.335 Under usual 
consular procedure, a consular official will review materials 
submitted as a matter of course by the visa applicant, such as an 
employment history or criminal record.336 If that history raises an 
issue, the consular official will inquire further. For example, in Kerry 
v. Din, the consular official apparently had questions about the 
applicant’s tenure as a clerk for a government office run by the 
Taliban.337 However, beyond producing documents such as an 
employment history, consular processing does not require that the 
visa applicant prove a negative, i.e., that he or she is not a threat. 
Proving a negative is often difficult. It is straightforward only 
regarding health, where a doctor’s exam will demonstrate the 
absence of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis. However, 
333. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
334. EO-3, § 3(c)(i), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,168 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
335. Id. § 3(c)(i)(B), at 45,168.
336. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2013).
337. 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131-32 (2015).
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there is no doctor’s exam for rebutting an administrative presumption 
that an individual is a threat to national security. 
The first and third waiver criteria introduce elements that do 
not figure at all in visa decisions under the INA. Congress knew how 
to require a showing of “hardship” under the statute.338 It has done so 
in several other immigration provisions, such as the requirement that 
undocumented noncitizens applying for a remedy called 
“cancellation of removal” show “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to a close family member who is a citizen or LPR.339
However, the INA does not require any showing of hardship by 
ordinary visa applicants overseas. Similarly, a visa applicant who 
qualifies for a family-based, employment, or other visa and is not 
excludable because of a criminal record, a communicable disease, or 
other factors need not also show that his or her admission would be 
in the “national interest” of the United States. The INA’s scheme 
treats this as a given if the visa applicant’s admission promotes 
family reunification with relatives in the United States, economic 
competitiveness for U.S. businesses, or other purposes contemplated 
by the statute. Requiring a further showing adds new hurdles to visa 
processing that Congress has not intended.
In addition to its clash with the sovereign interests Congress 
has carefully inscribed in the INA, EO-3 imposes substantial 
collateral impacts on U.S. persons. Because of its indefinite duration, 
EO-3’s collateral impacts on U.S. citizens and LPRs far exceed the 
effects wrought by EO-2’s temporary restrictions. Moreover, EO-3
relies on an interpretation of the “entry” provision, § 1182(f), which 
lacks an intelligible limiting principle.340 The temporary restrictions 
in EO-2 at least had clear temporal end-points. In contrast, EO-3’s 
restrictions are indefinite. Damage to the INA from a temporary, 
one-time restriction on admissions is inherently contained. The same 
cannot be said of the imposition of indefinite restrictions that are 
subject only to internal review within the executive branch. 
5. EO-3 and More Searching Review
Since EO-3 does not fit shared stewardship’s criteria for 
relaxed review, it requires more searching scrutiny. EO-3 cannot 
meet that more exacting standard. Its blunt means are far too 
338. EO-3, § 3(c)(i)(A), 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,168.
339. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012).
340. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
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imprecise to effectively reduce foreign nationals’ terrorism-related 
conduct in the United States. In responding to this threat, EO-3
manages to be both markedly under- and over-inclusive.341 This is 
true with respect to both its analysis of conditions in the listed 
countries and the fit between its restrictions and the track-record of 
foreign nationals in the United States who have committed terrorism-
related offenses. 
First, consider the Proclamation’s application of its stated 
criteria regarding country conditions.342 Those criteria are three-fold. 
EO-3 purports to value a state’s responsibility for identity-
management protocols, such as using electronic passports embedded 
with the passport-holder’s biographic and biometric data and 
informing other countries and international organizations about lost 
or stolen passports. Second, EO-3 purports to consider whether a 
state shares national security and public-safety information, such as 
data about terrorism or security threats.343 Third, EO-3 cites the 
importance of national security and public-safety risk assessment, 
including whether a state accepts the return of its own nationals 
when U.S. immigration officials have obtained a final order of 
removal for those individuals.344
From one angle, EO-3 is notably over-inclusive.345 Several 
countries affected by EO-3 use identity-management protocols of the 
kind that the Proclamation requires. For example, four of the listed 
countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Venezuela—issue electronic 
passports.346 The international law enforcement agency, Interpol, 
reported in 2014 that Iran was “very strong” in its efforts to share 
information on lost or stolen passports,347 while Libya, Somalia, 
Syria, and Venezuela all share substantial information.348 With 
respect to sharing national security and public-safety information, 
341. See IRAP v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 610 (D. Md. 2017).
342. See EO-3, § 1(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,168.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective 
Criteria, CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 9, 2017, 2:07 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
travel-ban-based-executive-whim-not-objective-criteria [https://perma.cc/KM8U-
22NN]. Analyst David Bier of the Cato Institute has undertaken the most diligent 
and methodical review of EO-3’s criteria. See id.
346. See id.; ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) Participants, INT’L CIV.
AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), https://icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-
PKDParticipants.aspx [https://perma.cc/8WCN-WA2T] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
347. See Bier, supra note 345. 
348. See id.
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Chad and Yemen use a U.S.-devised system—the Personal 
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System 
(PISCES)—to report terrorist incidents.349 While Iran does not use 
this system, it does coordinate with the Iraqi government and with 
Syria in the armed conflict with ISIS, in which the United States also 
participates.350 It is logical to infer that such coordination entails 
some information-sharing. Whether U.S. officials consider that 
degree of information-sharing to be sufficient is difficult to discern 
from the face of EO-3, which provides no objective baseline for this 
factor regarding the frequency or volume of information-sharing 
expected.
EO-3 is also over-inclusive regarding national security risk 
indicators. One factor here is a country’s willingness to permit 
readmission of nationals of that country who have received final 
orders of removal from the United States.351 Without that 
cooperation, U.S. officials cannot effectively conduct removal of 
noncitizens whose conducted has violated U.S. immigration laws. 
Only one of the listed countries—Iran—has been listed recently as 
failing to provide such cooperation.352
EO-3’s list is also markedly under-inclusive in applying its 
criteria to countries around the globe. Almost 100 countries—
including scores not on the list—did not issue electronic passports, 
and many others permitted their nationals to use old paper passports
still in their possession.353 Moreover, over 150 countries either rarely 
or never report lost or stolen passports to international authorities.354
In addition, all but one of the countries that fail to cooperate in 
349. Id.; Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July
2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KT8A-ZTZN] (describing Chad and reporting on Yemen).
350. See Bier, supra note 345. 
351. See EO-3, § 1(c)(iii), 83 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,168 (Sept. 24, 2017).
352. See Bier, supra note 345. 
353. See id.; ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) Participants, supra note 
346. 
354. See Bier, supra note 345; Passport Fraud: An International 
Vulnerability: Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. (2014) (testimony of Alan Bersin, PLCY Office of Int’l Affairs Assistant Sec’y 
& John Wagner, CBP Office of Field Operations Acting Deputy Assistant Comm’r), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/04/04/written-testimony-plcy-office-international-
affairs-and-cbp-office-field-operations [https://perma.cc/LZ74-ATCH].
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readmission of nationals subject to U.S. removal orders are not on 
the list.355
EO-3’s restrictions also fail to fit the pattern of terrorism-
related offenses in the United States. Noncitizens from the countries 
listed in the Proclamation accounted for under fifteen percent of 
terrorism-related federal offenses committed within the United 
States, such as material support of a foreign terrorist group.356 The 
cohort of offenders from the listed countries was small in absolute 
terms. Moreover, it represented an exceedingly small fraction of the 
total number of individuals admitted to the United States from each 
listed country. Since March 2011, the federal government has 
documented terrorism-related conduct located primarily in the 
United States—including acts of violence—involving approximately 
forty foreign-born individuals.357 According to a draft study prepared 
by the Department of Homeland Security, native-born U.S. citizens 
were more likely to commit such offenses than foreign-born U.S. 
persons from all other countries combined.358
Moreover, because terrorism is a low-incidence crime in which 
base rates are very low in any national population, detecting signals 
of terrorist tendencies in any such cohort is exceptionally difficult: 
The sorting task is analogous to finding the proverbial needle in a 
haystack. Compounding the problem, the bulk of foreign-born 
individuals in the United States who had committed terrorism-related 
offenses of any kind had been in the country for years prior to their 
arrest, suggesting that more rigorous vetting would not have helped 
355. Bier, supra note 345; Stephen Dinan, Trump Presses More Countries 
Take Back U.S. Deportees in Immigration Success, WASH. TIMES (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/16/countries-refusing-us-
deportees-cut-from-20-to-12 [https://perma.cc/7YVP-SHXA].
356. See Most Foreign-born, US-Based Violent Extremists Radicalized After 
Entering Homeland; Opportunities for Tailored CVE Programs Exist, OFF. OF 
INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 5 (Mar. 2017), 
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trms-exclusive-dhs-document-
undermines-trump-case-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/S6FL-8J78] [hereinafter DHS 
Draft Study II].
357. Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the 
United States, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 1 (2017), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/dhs-
7countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7EL-2VN5] [hereinafter DHS Draft Study I]. This 
group encompasses persons across a spectrum of immigration and citizenship status. 
See DHS Draft Study II, supra note 356, at 3 (listing eighty-eight foreign-born 
violent extremists between March 2011 and December 2016). The sample does not 
include criminal conduct focused overseas, such as departing the United States to 
join a terrorist organization. Id. Those numbers are also small in absolute terms. 
358. See DHS Draft Study I, supra note 357, at 1.
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identify such individuals.359 Furthermore, in this group, foreign 
nationals from the countries covered by EO-3 were less than twenty-
five percent of the total.360 Those numbers indicate that EO-3 is 
markedly under-inclusive in certain respects, omitting countries such 
as Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kenya, Pakistan, and 
Uzbekistan that together accounted for substantially more terrorism-
related conduct than countries listed in the Proclamation.361
In addition, EO-3 is markedly over-inclusive. For example, it 
covers children under fifteen years of age.362 Beyond a disqualifying 
communicable disease and a record of petty criminal offenses, it is 
difficult to imagine that a minor below the age of fifteen could have 
engaged in conduct that renders him or her inadmissible. 
Nevertheless, EO-3 excludes members of this cohort, in effect 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 
In sum, EO-3’s indefinite duration, impact on U.S. families, 
and undermining of the INA disqualify it for shared stewardship’s 
deferential review. Consequently, assessment of EO-3 requires 
application of a more searching standard. EO-3 lacks the precise 
means-end fit required under this more robust review. It therefore 
exceeds the power that Congress delegated to immigration officials.
6. EO-3 and the Establishment Clause
If President Trump’s campaign, post-election, and post-
inaugural statements are at the very least part of the backdrop for a 
statutory analysis of the revised EO, they play an even more 
prominent role in addressing whether the revised EO clashes with the 
Establishment Clause. Here, as with the statutory issue, both the 
government and the EO’s challengers have taken extreme positions. 
The government has asserted that President Trump’s statements are 
simply irrelevant to the Establishment Clause issue.363 In contrast, the 
Fourth Circuit selected a skewed subset of statements by candidate, 
359. See DHS Draft Study II, supra note 356, at 7.
360. Id. at 5; see also EO-3, § 1(h)(ii), 83 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,164 (Sept. 
24, 2017) (listing the countries included in the travel ban).
361. See DHS Draft Study II, supra note 356.
362. See EO-3, § 3(c)(iv)(E), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,169 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
363. See Peter Margulies, The Fourth Circuit and the Refugee EO: 
Establishing Confusion, LAWFARE (May 26, 2017, 1:15 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/fourth-circuit-and-refugee-eo-establishing-confusion 
[https://perma.cc/454S-Q9EQ].
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President-elect, and President Trump and Trump surrogates.364 A
shared stewardship model would consider all of Trump’s statements 
but would require a uniform showing of religious animus absent in 
this case to trigger more searching means-end scrutiny. In the multi-
dimensional arena of foreign affairs, requiring a lesser showing to 
make out an Establishment Clause violation would license rampant 
judicial second-guessing of legislative and executive decisions and 
impair the sovereign interests of the United States. 
As in the statutory context, it is useful to note that a legal 
analysis that requires a uniform showing of religious animus does 
not entail ethical, moral, or political support for statements made on 
the campaign trail or subsequently by President Trump. One could 
view even a single statement, such as then-candidate Trump’s call 
for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States,”365 as antithetical to the best view of American politics and 
public service. However, a legal test should not engender unintended 
consequences that undermine the Framers’ goal of a “workable 
government,”366 particularly in the complex realm of foreign policy. 
That is where the EO critics’ Establishment Clause arguments fall 
short. 
Application of the Establishment Clause to national security, 
foreign policy, and immigration risks interference with sovereign 
interests because of the multiplicity of factors that trigger 
government action in this dynamic arena.367 The Establishment 
Clause prohibits government actions intended to and likely to 
produce injury or aid to religion.368 However, the Supreme Court has 
oscillated between tests under the Establishment Clause, producing 
little in the way of coherent guidance.369 The Court’s kaleidoscopic 
364. That court also interpreted ambiguous statements as favoring the EO’s 
challengers. Id.
365. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th Cir. 2017).
366. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
367. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (citing “political branches’ broad power” over immigration).
368. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005).
369. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court 
announced a test for an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 612-13 (stating that, to 
withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, a measure (1) must have a “secular” 
purpose, (2) cannot have a “primary effect” that “advances nor inhibits” religion, 
and (3) must not promote “excessive government entanglement” with religion). 
However, in Van Orden, the Court discounted the Lemon factors as “no more than 
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Establishment Clause case law may have to suffice as a template for 
the states, towns, and school districts that comprise the bulk of 
Establishment Clause defendants. However, the scattered rays of 
insight one can gather from this shifting jurisprudence do not serve 
well as a template for a sound foreign policy. 
For a graphic illustration of the Supreme Court’s own reticence 
in applying its complex Establishment Clause precedents to a case 
with even modest national security ramifications, consider Salazar v. 
Buono.370 In Salazar, Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of the 
Court,371 found no violation of the Establishment Clause in 
Congress’s transfer of a small parcel of land within the Mojave 
National Preserve to a private group to maintain a World War I 
memorial featuring a Latin cross. After expressing doubt that the 
“reasonable observer” test for government endorsement of religion 
adequately addressed the importance of private religious 
observance,372 Justice Kennedy noted that whether the cross 
conveyed a sectarian message would be “assessed in the context of 
all relevant factors.”373 According to Justice Kennedy, the cross at 
issue in Salazar “evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands 
of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans 
who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the 
fallen are forgotten.”374 As a result, Justice Kennedy found that 
invalidating the land transfer would not reflect the appropriate level 
of “[r]espect for a coordinate branch of Government.”375
Those same concerns should prompt even greater concern 
when a measure comprises part of the ongoing foreign affairs of the 
United States. A lower threshold for proving violations of the 
Establishment Clause would cast doubt on many executive and 
legislative moves in the foreign policy realm.376 Untangling religious 
from neutral factors is a difficult task.
helpful signposts.” 545 U.S. at 686 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 
(1973)). 
370. See generally Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
371. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion; Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred based on finding that the challenger 
of the measure lacked standing. Id. at 705, 729.
372. Id. at 720.
373. Id. at 721. 
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Establishment Clause cases hinging on official intent have a far 
narrower focus on the religious observance or the sustenance of a religious 
organization: For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 848, 852 
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In this regard, consider Congress’s passage of the Lautenberg 
Amendment, which requires that immigration officials presume that 
Jews and Evangelical Christians from the former Soviet Union and 
related states qualify for asylum.377 Under the Lautenberg 
Amendment, the groups covered did not have to go through the 
demanding asylum adjudication process required of other asylum 
claimants alleging a well-founded fear of persecution based on 
religion.378 In that sense, the Lautenberg Amendment gave an edge to 
particular religious groups. Nevertheless, the distinctive treatment 
authorized in this provision, along with subsequent amendments that 
covered other groups such as religious minorities from Iran,379
allowed the political branches to craft a tailored response to changing 
international political dynamics.380 Application of a rigid 
Establishment Clause standard would have denied the political 
branches this needed flexibility.
In addition, consider a significant event in post-World War II 
U.S. foreign policy: President Truman’s recognition of Israel.381
(2005), the Supreme Court invalidated a courthouse display of the Ten 
Commandments that the legislature had endorsed “in remembrance and honor of 
Jesus Christ.” In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254-55 (1982), the Court struck 
down a state law that limited religious congregations’ ability to fundraise outside of 
church services. Members of the legislature stated that the law targeted groups that 
relied on public in-person solicitation of contributors; one legislator described his 
colleagues as “hot to regulate the Moonies.” Candidate and President Trump’s 
comments, while they are deplorable, do not address religious observance or 
fundraising in this way. 
377. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157 n.(b)(2)(A) (2017) (providing that “[a]liens who 
are (or were) nationals and residents of an independent state of the former Soviet 
Union or of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania and who are Jews or Evangelical 
Christians shall be deemed” to be presumptive refugees).
378. Cf. Michael J. Churgin, Is Religion Different? Is There a Thumb on the 
Scale in Refugee Convention Appellate Court Adjudication in the United States? 
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 51 TEX. INT’L L.J. 213, 215 (2016) (asserting that 
“presumption of refugee eligibility” in the Lautenberg Amendment amounts to a 
“thumb on the scale for certain religious groups” that mandates a less onerous 
process than the one that typically applies in refugee adjudication).
379. See § 1157 n.(b)(1)(C). 
380. Today, many of the beneficiaries of the Lautenberg Amendment and 
subsequent provisions are Evangelical Christians from Ukraine fleeing violence in 
that country. See Miriam Jordan, Soviet-Era Program Gives Even Unoppressed 
Immigrants an Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/26/us/ukrainian-christian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/8V23-GNWM] 
(citing refugee advocates’ acknowledgment that this group is “still vulnerable to 
persecution in pro-Russian areas” of Ukraine).
381. See Richard Holbrooke, President Truman’s Decision to Recognize 
Israel, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (May 1, 2008), 
70 Michigan State Law Review 2018
Truman expressly recognized the creation of a “Jewish state” within 
Israel’s borders.382 Clark Clifford, Truman’s close advisor and a 
future Secretary of Defense under President Lyndon Johnson, 
recalled that Truman was fond of citing Deuteronomy 1:8, in which 
God decreed that the Israelites “go in and take possession of the land 
[of] . . . Abraham, . . . Isaac, and . . . Jacob.”383 One of Truman’s 
motivations was the intent to help Judaism survive and prosper. 
According to Clifford, Truman also articulated “moral and ethical” 
factors supporting “the foundation of a Jewish state.”384
Under the Establishment Clause theory propounded by the 
EO’s challengers, courts would also entertain challenges to decisions 
such as Truman’s. If courts agreed that the Lemon test was the proper 
vehicle for this challenge, plaintiffs would be allowed to conduct 
discovery on whether Truman had an appropriate secular purpose 
that outweighed his religious sentiments and whether the “primary 
effect” of the recognition decision was to help or hinder religion. 
Madison, who in Federalist No. 41 counseled vigilance regarding the 
hostile “exertions” of foreign powers, would have expressed alarm at 
using litigation to second-guess such fundamental foreign policy 
decisions.385
In addition to inhibiting U.S. foreign relations, the 
Establishment Clause challenge to the revised refugee EO also lacks 
intelligible limits. That absence of limits is clearest on the standard 
for using the statements of a political candidate or public official. 
While the government’s argument that those statements are never 
http://jcpa.org/article/president-truman%E2%80%99s-decision-to-recognize-israel/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ALU-922V].
382. Id.
383. See id. (quoting Deuteronomy 1:8).
384. Id.
385. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 15, at 257. Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (cautioning that allowing suits for damages could chill 
official decision-making in sensitive areas). While Abbasi’s analysis may have
overshot the mark in that case, its relevance to a lawsuit and discovery regarding 
recognition decisions is manifest; one could argue that recognition decisions are so 
wrapped up in the President’s power to conduct foreign relations under Article II of 
the Constitution that special rules should limit Establishment Clause challenges in 
that arena. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding that 
President had exclusive power to decide how questions involving the status of 
Jerusalem affected the listing of place of birth on a U.S. citizen’s passport, despite 
legislation to the contrary). However, a rule distinguishing recognition decisions 
from other foreign policy matters for Establishment Clause purposes would cause 
significant line-drawing problems that courts generally seek to avoid. See Chesney, 
supra note 7, at 1396. 
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relevant would provide no check at all, the challengers’ approach, 
largely adopted by the Fourth Circuit, fails to address the core 
problem with using politicians’ campaign statements: Campaigns are 
fluid processes in which a candidate’s statements can vary depending 
on his or her opponents, the audience, or different paragraphs in a 
single speech. 
As an illustration, consider the words of a President rightly 
recognized as among the best: Franklin D. Roosevelt. Historians 
often remember Roosevelt as the patron saint of deficit spending, 
who pioneered scores of social programs to get people back to work 
during the Great Depression.386 However, as the Princeton historian 
Julian Zelizer has argued, in the 1932 election, Roosevelt’s 
commitment to social programs did not deter him from campaigning 
against then President Herbert Hoover’s supposed fiscal 
extravagance—although Hoover’s spending was nowhere near the 
levels Roosevelt would reach after he moved into the White 
House.387 A complete picture of Roosevelt’s approach would have to 
examine each strand of his statements—but that picture was 
incomplete until Zelizer’s work more than fifty years after 
Roosevelt’s passing. It is doubtful that contemporary courts could 
have done full justice to Roosevelt’s subtly shifting remarks.
Similarly, Roosevelt was a moving target on the next great 
crisis he faced: America’s role in World War II. In 1940, World War 
II was already raging, but the United States was on the sidelines, 
kept there by a Congress and public that was wary of foreign 
entanglements. Just before the 1940 election, Roosevelt appeared at a 
Boston campaign rally to speak on the subject of America’s military 
capabilities.388 Roosevelt told the crowd to recognize the “obvious” 
fact that the war posed “dangers to all forms of democracy 
throughout the world.”389 Nevertheless, lest the crowd think 
Roosevelt was issuing this warning to signal an intent to enter the 
386. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, 
and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
587, 687 (2009) (discussing contemporary opposition to Roosevelt’s “social welfare 
programs”).
387. See Julian E. Zelizer, The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal 
Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1938, 30 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 331, 335 (2000). 
388. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States 1933-1945, 
Campaign Address at Boston, Massachusetts (Oct. 30, 1940), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15887 [https://perma.cc/6M75-CCXS].
389. Id.
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conflict, Roosevelt also assured the crowd that, “Your boys are not 
going to be sent into any foreign wars.”390
Less than two months before the speech, Roosevelt had agreed 
in the so-called “Destroyer Deal” to send Britain fifty outmoded U.S. 
Navy destroyers in exchange for the ability to maintain bases in
British possessions such as Antigua and Bermuda.391 To keep the 
political running room he needed, Roosevelt had to accompany all 
such initiatives with the disclaimer he issued in Boston about 
avoiding a U.S. combat role.392 A contemporary court may have 
found this single speech in Boston as difficult to parse as Roosevelt’s 
conflicting statements about government spending. However, that 
ambiguity was a feature, not a bug, in Roosevelt’s efforts to prepare 
the public for a larger U.S. role in the conflict, which came slightly 
over a year later with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Contemporaneous judicial efforts to discern Roosevelt’s authentic 
meaning could only have frustrated Roosevelt’s canny strategy. 
While few would confuse President Trump with Franklin 
Roosevelt, the Fourth Circuit did not consider the full range of 
candidate Trump’s remarks on matters related to the revised refugee 
EO. Judge Gregory, writing for the court, cited the “numerous 
occasions” on which candidate Trump urged a “total and complete 
shutdown” of Muslim immigration.393 However, newspaper accounts 
readily available to the court, but omitted from its opinion, showed 
twists and turns in Trump’s position. In May 2016, Trump said the 
proposed complete ban was “just a suggestion” and he was open to 
other ideas.394 In June and July 2016, Trump called for immigration 
measures tied to particular nations and “territory” where terrorism 
and armed conflict were prevalent.395
390. Id.
391. See Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule 
of Law, and National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 666 (2007).
392. See id. at 667-68. 
393. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th Cir. 2017).
394. See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump Is Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not 
Rolling It Back, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-
rolling-it-back/?utm_term=.6944cce18cdc [https://perma.cc/W5PH-LR3S].
395. See id. This rationale was an early variant of the rationale in the revised 
EO, stressing information deficits in dealing with countries that were embroiled in 
domestic armed conflicts or were state sponsors of terrorism. See EO-2, § 1(d), 82 
Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,210 (Mar. 6, 2017). Assuming an absence of uniform
statements showing religious animus, the Revised EO’s rationale would be 
consistent with the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard affirmed by Justice 
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Then-candidate Trump may well have been deceptive or 
insincere. However, as the Franklin Roosevelt example illustrates, 
sincerity in statecraft is a relative term, and even deception 
sometimes yields benefits for the public interest. Before embarking 
on electoral hermeneutics, courts should determine if their approach 
will usefully address Rooseveltian ambiguity, as well as Trumpian 
bluster. At the very least, the Fourth Circuit should have conducted a 
comprehensive inventory of Trump’s campaign statements and 
distinguished those that didn’t fully fit the attribution to Trump of 
anti-Muslim animus.396 The court failed to undertake this task, 
despite the availability of press accounts supplying such information. 
This gap proves that dissenting Judge Niemeyer was right to call out 
the majority’s “unbounded”397 negative implications for judicial 
methodology.
A shared stewardship approach would steer clear of the Fourth 
Circuit’s unbounded venture into campaign semiotics while retaining 
the ability to consider a uniform pattern of statements over time.398
Suppose that campaign and post-election statements indicated a 
uniform, longstanding purpose to either help or hinder a religious 
group. Having examined the complete record and made that 
determination, a court could then insist that the government show a 
closer means-end fit for the challenged measure.399
This approach would preserve sovereign interests over foreign 
affairs and offer an intelligible limiting principle for judicial forays 
into campaign hermeneutics. It would recognize that all officials who 
appear in public occasionally make statements that are ambiguous, 
hasty, or tailored to a particular audience. Finding a uniform and 
comprehensive pattern of statements reflecting the intent to help or 
hurt a religion indicates that the official in question has failed the test 
of stewardship, warranting heightened judicial scrutiny. Subjected to 
Kennedy in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (quoting Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)). 
396. Compare IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594, with Johnson, supra note 394.
397. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 650; see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 
1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (noting that “[c]andidates say many things on the campaign trail; they are 
often contradictory or inflammatory”). 
398. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
399. This test is narrower than the broader standard urged by some 
commentators. See generally Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential 
Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017) (arguing that courts can consider 
presidential speech when inquiring into purpose, without proposing limits on that 
consideration). 
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the full pressure of the Lemon test and failing the secular purpose 
prong, the revised EO would then fall by the wayside.400
400. President Obama’s initiatives would encounter a mixed reception under 
the shared stewardship model. Pursuing the commendable policy goal of 
compensating for Congress’s failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform, 
the Obama administration authored two important programs: Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans (DAPA) and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA). See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_actio
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TUG-TBUG] (announcing DAPA); Consideration of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/N6WZ-WLGP] (last updated Jan. 13, 
2018).
DAPA was the larger program by a substantial margin; it entailed 
granting work authorization and a renewable reprieve from removal to over four 
million of the roughly 11 million undocumented noncitizens in the United States. 
Primarily because of its scale, DAPA would not have fared well under any of the 
shared stewardship criteria. Its most glaring flaw was its lack of intelligible limits. 
As with any administrative measure, DAPA had to fit into the “harmonious whole” 
of the INA. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
Congress has regularly sought to curb executive discretion on reprieves from 
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2012) (curbing executive practice of 
granting “extended voluntary departure” (EVD) to noncitizens without a legal 
status). Congress’s effort to cabin executive discretion on reprieves from removal 
would make little sense if immigration officials could circumvent these limits by 
announcing a sweeping new program. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 
178-82 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); 
Peter Margulies, Deferred Action and the Bounds of Agency Discretion: Reconciling
Policy and Legality in Immigration Enforcement, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 159 
(2015) (observing that, “[h]aving balked at the relatively modest discretionary 
benefits provided by EVD . . . Congress would surely bridle at the cornucopia of 
benefits provided by DAPA”); see also Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of 
DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 216 
(2015) (arguing that DAPA overstepped presidential authority). 
DACA presents a different case with clearer limits. It granted relief 
from removal and work authorization to a substantially smaller group: 
undocumented children whose parents brought them to the United States. 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra.
Noncitizens in this group had no control over their parents’ decision to enter the 
country without a legal status. Id. In addition, DACA recipients have developed 
close ties to the United States and often have virtually no connection to their 
nominal countries of origin. Id. Relief for this group is thus closer to the narrowly 
tailored relief from a range of hardships, including serious illness, disability, and 
extreme youth or old age, that has long been a mainstay of the immigration system. 
See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
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D. Retroactive Application of Removal Grounds: Against Playing 
“Gotcha!”
Since our discussion of shared stewardship thus far has 
centered on persons located abroad, it is appropriate in this final 
Section to address the rights of noncitizens already here. A perennial 
issue alluded to earlier has been the retroactive effect of changes in 
immigration law. For over a century, the Supreme Court has agreed 
that Congress can make immigration laws retroactive if it states its 
intent clearly.401 The shared stewardship model departs from this 
longstanding default, precluding Congress from retroactively 
applying new criteria for the removal of noncitizens.402
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy403
is perhaps the most extensive modern statement of the reasons for 
permitting retroactive removal criteria. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Jackson asserted that the United States’ sovereign interest in the 
effective “conduct of foreign” policy404 justified retroactive 
application of a removal provision based on the noncitizens’ past 
membership in the Communist Party. The longtime LPRs ordered 
removed in Harisiades had each terminated their membership in the 
Communist Party years prior to Congress’s expressly designating 
past membership as a basis for removal.405 Application of the ground 
to the noncitizens who challenged their removal in Harisiades upset 
reliance interests that the Court has generally sought to honor, at 
least in the statutory context. However, faced with a clear statement 
from Congress, the Harisiades Court held that due process did not 
require limiting Congress to prospective application.406
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 2, 55, 63 (2015). But see Robert 
J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause,
91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783-84 (2013) (arguing that DACA exceeded presidential 
authority).
401. Justice Holmes stated this in typically blunt fashion. See Bugajewitz v. 
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (citing Johnannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 
227, 242 (1912)) (noting that deportation was not punishment and therefore was not 
included within the constraints of the Ex Post Facto Clause; deportation is “simply a 
refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it does not want”). 
402. The Court has long read ambiguous immigration statutes as only 
applying prospectively. See Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 261 (2012); 
Morawetz, supra note 181, at 140; Motomura, supra note 181, at 568.  
403. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
404. See id.
405. See id. at 593.
406. See id. at 591.
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To justify this stark holding, Justice Jackson resorted to what 
Professor Hiroshi Motomura has called the “contract theory” of 
immigration.407 Under this theory, legal immigrants know that the 
United States has admitted them under certain conditions and with 
certain background understandings.408 One such understanding is that 
immigrants are merely probationary members of U.S. society. As 
such, they are subject to both the removal grounds in place at the 
time of their admission and those grounds that Congress has seen fit 
to add later, including removal grounds that based deportation on 
conduct the noncitizen engaged in before the legislation became 
effective. For Jackson, the immigrant consented to these conditions, 
harsh though they might be in particular settings like those that 
prevailed in Harisiades itself.409 That consent made retroactive 
application fair.
Arguing that the bargain here was not one-sided, Justice 
Jackson claimed that the noncitizen gained from his or her 
probationary status prior to naturalization. According to Jackson, the 
noncitizen, unlike a U.S. citizen, could marshal the diplomatic efforts 
of a foreign power on his or her behalf.410 Moreover, Jackson noted, 
the noncitizen did not incur certain risks of citizenship, such as
exposure to conscription into the armed forces of the United States. 
These benefits, Jackson asserted, made the “contract” entered into by 
the arriving noncitizen a fair one, despite what in other contexts the 
Court would view as the unfairness of retroactive legislation.411
Justice Jackson’s account both exaggerated the benefits of 
noncitizens’ probationary status and muted the adverse consequences 
of that status. Let us consider the latter first, through shared 
stewardship’s focus on collateral impacts. Permitting retroactive
laws undermines the legislative process and diminishes the 
productivity of noncitizens. In each respect, Justice Stevens’ opinion 
for the Court in INS v. St. Cyr412 is a valuable guide. Justice Stevens 
was troubled by the prospect that Congress could legislate 
retroactively “as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or 
407. See id. at 585; MOTOMURA, supra note 8, at 9-11 (describing the 
contract theory of immigration).
408. See MOTOMURA, supra note 8, at 9-11.
409. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587. 
410. See id. at 585-86. 
411. Id.
412. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (providing guidance 
on legislative processes and productivity of noncitizens).
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individuals.”413 According to Justice Stevens, retroactive legislation 
also deprives people of “confidence about the legal consequences of 
their actions.”414 Just as Hamilton predicted that unfair laws would 
“sap the foundations of public and private confidence,”415 Justice 
Stevens expressed concern that retroactive application would 
undermine our “free, dynamic society”416 and suppress “creativity in 
both commercial and artistic endeavors.”417
The supposed benefits of immigrant status that Justice Jackson 
invoked in Harisiades do not outweigh these burdens.418 While in 
theory a foreign national can call upon his or her government for 
protection, foreign governments have rarely been effective in halting 
the removal of noncitizens from the United States.419 Similarly, 
international law is of modest help. Even basic rights to be accorded 
foreign nationals under international law, such as notification of that 
individual’s consulate in the United States in the event the noncitizen 
is arrested, have been ignored or minimized by some U.S. 
jurisdictions.420 The erratic and unreliable benefits provided by 
international law hardly outweigh the costs of retroactive application 
for noncitizens.
Along with adverse collateral impacts, permitting retroactive 
application of removal grounds has no limiting principle. In 
Harisiades, removal subjected longtime legal residents of the United 
States to a wrenching shift that the Court itself has described as 
413. See id. at 315. Cf. id. at 315 n.39 (explaining vulnerabilities of 
noncitizens). As a judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Neil Gorsuch 
eloquently stated similar views. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1146 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting due process concerns with retroactive application, 
since “retroactive application of new penalties to past conduct that affected persons 
cannot now change denies them fair notice of the law and risks endowing a 
decisionmaker expressly influenced by majoritarian politics with the power to single 
out disfavored individuals for mistreatment”).
414. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (quoting Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994)). 
415. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note at 15, at 470.
416. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66).
417. See id. 
418. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585-86 (1952). 
419. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001), the Court noted that 
an effective tack for a country was to refuse to accept the repatriation of its own 
nationals after those individuals had received final orders of removal. However, the 
impact of this step is limited; it may result in the noncitizen’s release from detention, 
but it will not modify the underlying removal order. 
420. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530-32 (2008) (holding that treaty 
requiring consular notification and establishing safeguards for criminal defendants 
denied this right was not self-executing and thus not enforceable in federal court).  
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being “the equivalent of banishment.”421 Retroactive application of 
removal grounds may often be harsher in practice than the ex post 
facto criminal laws that the Constitution forbids. Criminal laws may 
provide only modest penalties, depending on the sentences 
prescribed. In contrast, removal of longtime residents is in effect a 
life sentence of exile from relationships and commitments that may 
have evolved over decades. 422
Finally, it is far from clear that the power to retroactively apply 
removal criteria materially aids the United States’ sovereign 
interests. On the level of design, barring retroactive application 
would impair the nation’s ability to rethink removal criteria. That 
consequence is not trivial, as the addition of removal grounds after 
September 11 demonstrates. However, one should not overstate these 
costs. Consider one post-9/11 addition to the INA: the addition of 
terrorism-related offenses such as material support of a terrorist 
organization.423 In dealing with this problem, the government has 
many tools at its disposal if the individual persists in the activity, 
including criminal prosecution.424 Moreover, if the individual who 
may have engaged in material support is still a noncitizen, the 
government can also resort to prospective application of removal 
grounds if the conduct in question recurs.425 In other words, the 
added value of retroactive application does not yield significant gains 
in addressing exigent situations. 
Moreover, on the issue of the design of removal grounds, 
permitting retroactive application sends a discordant message. As the 
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause demonstrates, disdain for 
retroactive legislation is a foundational commitment of American 
governance.426 Ignoring this principle in order to target a politically 
vulnerable group suggests that our passion for avoiding unfairness is 
421. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). 
422. See Aleinikoff, supra note 146, at 244 (noting “actual relationships the 
individual has developed with a society . . . [including] a family, friends, a job, 
association memberships, professional acquaintances, opportunities”). 
423. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2012).
424. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting material support of terrorist 
activity); § 2339B (prohibiting material support of foreign terrorist groups); see also 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (upholding material 
support law against First Amendment challenge).
425. Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 273-74 (2012).
426. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810) (explaining that this 
provision, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Contracts Clause were designed by 
the Framers to counter legislators’ penchant for “violent acts which might grow out 
of the feelings of the moment”).
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disconcertingly contingent, rather than constitutive. Giving the 
political branches the power to send that deflating message 
undermines the abiding sovereign interests of the United States. To 
safeguard those interests, shared stewardship would rule out 
retroactive application of removal grounds.
CONCLUSION
The retroactivity of removable grounds is a case study in the 
difficulty of deriving clear and coherent rules on judicial review of 
immigration law. Indeed, in some ways that issue understates the 
dimensions of the problem. At least in the retroactivity arena, courts 
have arrived at a consensus: interpret ambiguous statutes to permit 
only prospective application, while upholding retroactive application 
when Congress issues a clear statement. As we have just seen, there 
are persuasive arguments that the consensus is wrong. However, at 
least in this area, its parameters are clear for courts, policymakers, 
and the public. 
The same cannot be said for other areas of immigration law. 
The judicial response to President Trump’s refugee EOs has thus far 
highlighted the lack of guidance in case law and commentary 
regarding executive power. Concerns about the “extreme vetting” 
that will accompany EO-3 exacerbate this problem. The attenuated 
nature of the Court’s rationale for distinguishing the gender-based 
citizenship statute struck down in Sessions v. Morales-Santana from 
valid gender-based statutes has increased the puzzlement of 
stakeholders. 
The prime candidates for supplying that guidance have 
problems of their own. The deference that the Court has long 
invoked does not fit the close means-end scrutiny deployed in 
Morales-Santana or the fine adjustments that the Court made in its 
stay order in IRAP v. Trump.427 The normalization thesis, which 
would generally require the same close means-end nexus of 
immigration measures that courts already require for domestic laws, 
unduly discounts the nation’s concern with the composition of the 
community and the exigencies of foreign policy. A stable, normative 
regime will not stem from either mechanical deference or the failure 
to acknowledge immigration’s genuine differences from wholly 
domestic law.
427. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017); Trump 
v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2017).
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Shared stewardship seeks to fill the gap. To address whether 
heightened judicial review is appropriate, shared stewardship 
considers three factors conjunctively: (1) degree of sovereign 
interest, (2) number and intensity of collateral impacts, and (3) 
absence of intelligible limits.428 Each factor figures in the Framers’ 
thought and the Supreme Court’s case law, although the latter 
sometimes elevates the perceived foreign policy aspects of a 
challenged measure and downplays concern with collateral impacts 
and intelligible limits. Balanced attention to all three factors will lead 
to a clearer and more cohesive model of judicial review.
In at least two important areas—vetting of visa applicants by 
consular officials and retroactive application of removal grounds—
shared stewardship’s criteria lead to different results than current 
case law. Shared stewardship would prohibit vexatious or unduly 
onerous requests for information from consular officials to visa 
applicants and bar retroactive application of newly enacted removal 
provisions. In reaching those different results, shared stewardship is 
more skeptical than current case law about the foreign affairs 
implications of certain immigration decisions and more concerned 
with requiring a floor of fairness that will both discipline the political 
branches and send a positive signal to the rest of the world. Shared 
stewardship would also view EO-3 as inconsistent with the INA 
because of the absence of a limiting principle governing the EO’s 
indefinite restrictions.
Shared stewardship will not eliminate close cases in 
immigration law. Nor will it end debates about the degree of 
deference that courts display. However, shared stewardship will 
ensure a judicial role in key areas where that role has until now been 
muted. Moreover, shared stewardship will enlist the courts’ capacity 
for judgment without unduly intruding on U.S. sovereign interests. 
Given immigration law’s importance for the near future under 
President Trump and the longer term flourishing of the American 
experiment, achieving that balance is worth the effort.
428. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
